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ON ECONOMETRIC INFERENCE
AND MULTIPLE USE OF THE SAME DATA
BENJAMIN HOLCBLAT AND STEFFEN GRØNNEBERG
Abstract. In fields that are mainly nonexperimental, such as economics and finance, it
is inescapable to compute test statistics and confidence regions that are not probabilis-
tically independent from previously examined data. The Bayesian and Neyman-Pearson
inference theories are known to be inadequate for such a practice. We show that these
inadequacies also hold m.a.e. (modulo approximation error). We develop a general
econometric theory, called the neoclassical inference theory, that is immune to this in-
adequacy m.a.e. The neoclassical inference theory appears to nest model calibration,
and most econometric practices, whether they are labelled Bayesian or a` la Neyman-
Pearson. We derive a general, but simple adjustment to make standard errors account
for the approximation error.
Keywords: Hypothesis testing; Confidence region; Estimation; Model calibration.
JEL classification: C1.
1. Introduction
By definition, in nonexperimental fields, new data cannot be generated. Consequently,
it is inescapable to compute test statistics and confidence regions that are not probabilis-
tically independent from previously examined data. By the Skorohod’s representation
(1976), this practice is equivalent to using twice the same data, so that we call it mul-
tiple use of the same data.1 The main objective of this paper is to develop a general
econometric theory, called the neoclassical inference theory,2 that is adequate for multiple
use of the same data m.a.e. (modulo approximation error). The Bayesian and Neyman-
Pearson inference theories are not adequate for such a practice, even m.a.e. Thus, if we
Date: November 7, 2018.
1The Skorohod’s representation (1976) states that, for any two Borel random variables Y and Z, there
exist a Borel random variable U independent from Y , and a Borel function h(., .) such that Z = h(Y,U).
Thus, if Y and Z are not independent, using first Y , and then Z is equivalent to using first Y , and then
reusing Y with U .
2There are two reasons for this name. Firstly, it is a classical theory, in the statistical sense of the term,
i.e., in this theory, the unknown parameter θ0 is not treated as a random variable, but as a constant.
Secondly, it is neoclassical in the historical sense of the term: it seems to formalize underlying principles
of work by classical authors (e.g., Laplace, 1812/1820, livre II, chap. 3; Fisher, 1925/1973, part V).
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set aside approximation errors, for which we provide an adjustment, this paper elucidates
why econometric inference is possible in fields that are mainly nonexperimental, such as
economics and finance.
1.1. Key idea. In Bayesian and Neyman-Pearson theories, test statistics and confidence
regions are not independent from data as the former are functions of the latter even
m.a.e. Then, if the same realized data are re-used to compute new test statistics or
confidence regions, distributions conditional on the previously observed statistics should
be considered (e.g., Lehmann and Romano, 1959/2005, sec. 10.1 for Neyman-Pearson
theory; Savage, 1954/1972, sec. 3.5 for Bayesian theory). We show that this conditioning,
which is typically ignored in practice, is a challenge for Bayesian and Neyman-Pearson
theories. The neoclassical inference theory circumvents this conditioning. The key idea is
to use realized data to approximate the distribution of random variables, called generic
proxies, that have the same unconditional distribution as data-based statistics, but are
probabilistically independent from the realized data.
Example. Let X1:T := (Xt)
T
t=1 be data that are assumed to be T i.i.d. (independent and
identically distributed) random variables following a Gaussian distribution with mean θ0
and standard deviation s, denoted N (θ0, s). The realized data are X1:T (ω) := (Xt(ω))Tt=1
where ω denotes an element of the sample space Ω. We want to make inference about the
unknown parameter θ0 = E(X1) through its finite-sample proxy, the average. Now, con-
sider generic data X•1:T := (X
•
t )
T
t=1 that are independently generated by the same Gaussian
distribution as the data X1:T , i.e., X1:T and X
•
1:T are independent, but have the same un-
conditional distribution. Then, the average of the data XT , denoted XT :=
1
T
∑T
t=1Xt,
and the average of the generic data, denoted X
•
T , have the same unconditional distribu-
tion, N (θ0, s√T ), and are equally informative about θ0. Nevertheless, previous knowledge
of the realized data X1:T (ω) typically affects the distribution of XT , but does not affect
the distribution of the generic proxy X
•
T . For example, if the realized average XT (ω) is
known from a previous study, there is no uncertainty about it, so that its distribution is
a Dirac at the realized average (i.e., δXT (ω)), while the distribution of X
•
T is still the same
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Gaussian distribution, N (θ0, s√T ). Thus, the idea of the neoclassical inference theory is to
rely on an approximation of the distribution of X
•
T to make inference about θ0. Although
the data X1:T are independent from the generic proxy X
•
T , their observation provides an
approximation of its distribution. For example, by the Lindeberg-Le´vy CLT (central limit
theorem), a Gaussian distribution centered at the realized average, XT (ω), with standard
deviation sT (X1:T (ω))√
T
:=
√
1
T
∑T
t=1(Xt(ω)−XT (ω))
2
√
T
, is an approximation of the distribution of
X
•
T , which is N (θ0, s√T ). 
A similar idea is present in Monte-Carlo simulation methods : The observation of real-
ized random variables enables the approximation of the distribution of a generic random
variable, which is independent from the realized ones. In fact, this similarity has a math-
ematical underpinning under the standard assumption of ergodicity, which stipulates an
equivalence between exploration of the sample space and exploration of the time dimen-
sion.
In a way, the neoclassical inference theory generalizes the immunity of the standard
justification of point estimators, consistency, to confidence intervals and tests. Unlike the
Neyman-Pearson justifications for tests and confidence regions, consistency is immune to
multiple use of the same data m.a.e. A consistent point estimator of a parameter θ0 does
not depend on the realized data m.a.e.: by the definition of consistency, for almost all
possible realizations of the data, such a point estimator is arbitrary close to the fixed
parameter θ0 m.a.e. See Appendix A on p. 43 for a formal statement.
1.2. Literature overview. In the statistical and econometric literature, the issue raised
by multiple use of the same data for Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian inference theories
has been occasionally discussed. E.g., Lehmann and Romano, 1959/2005, sec. 10.1 for
Neyman-Pearson theory; Berger, 1980/2006, pp. 112–113 and 284 for Bayesian theory;
Leamer, 1978, pp. v–vii for an assessment of the acuteness of the issue, and chap. 9 for
an ad hoc proposal to mitigate the issue for Bayesian inference. The common wisdom
seems to be that the issue is unavoidable. To the best of our knowledge, no general
formal solution has been proposed even m.a.e. Holcblat (2012) relies on the idea behind
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the neoclassical theory only in the particular case of the empirical saddlepoint (ESP)
approximation.
Multiple use of the same data is not treated in the large literature about multiple hy-
pothesis testing (e.g., Lehmann and Romano, 1959/2005, chap. 9 for a perspective a` la
Neyman-Pearson; Berger, 1980/2006, chap. 7 for a Bayesian perspective). In this litera-
ture, it is assumed that the set of all statistics to be potentially computed is determined
before examination of the data. This situation does not correspond to nonexperimental
fields as their evolution is often the result of a hard-to-predict dialogue between theory
and empirical studies based on more or less the same realized data. For example, Com-
pustat, CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) and BEA (Bureau of Economic
Analysis) data have been re-used in numerous empirical studies in corporate finance, asset
pricing and macroeconomics, respectively.
1.3. Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3,
respectively, show that Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian inference theories are inadequate
for multiple use of the same data even m.a.e. Section 4 presents elements of the neoclas-
sical theory, and proves its immunity to multiple use of the same data m.a.e. Section 5
revisits model calibration and prominent econometric practices from a neoclassical point
of view, and presents a simple adjustment to make standard errors account for the ap-
proximation error. An important point to note is that this standard-error adjustment
holds under the usual
√
T -asymptotic normality assumption, thus applying to a large
part of econometric practice. Some readers may find sections 2 and 3 obvious, but the
latter should be considered in comparison with section 4. The contribution of this paper
is essentially theoretical, and not mathematical. Applied econometricians might want to
focus on subsection 5.3, which assesses the most common econometric practice from a
neoclassical point of view.
Remark 1. In accordance with the main objective of this paper, we reason m.a.e. in sec-
tions 2- 4. For the Neyman-Pearson theory, ignoring approximation errors means that we
consider the asymptotic limit superior (or limit inferior) of the outer (or inner) probability
ECONOMETRIC INFERENCE AND MULTIPLE USE OF THE SAME DATA 5
distribution to be exact for the given sample size, when the sampling distribution is not
available. For the Bayesian theory, this has no bearing because probability distributions
are assumed to be perfectly known by the econometrician (e.g., Savage, 1954/1972, pp.
59–60). For the neoclassical inference theory, this means that we consider the approxima-
tion of the sampling distribution of the generic proxy to be exact. Unlike sections 2- 4,
section 5 does not reason m.a.e., and treats of the approximation error from a neoclassical
point of view. 
2. Neyman-Pearson theory and multiple use of the same data
In this section, we explain the m.a.e. inadequacy of the Neyman-Pearson theory for
multiple use of the same data. Subsection 2.1 informally explains it in the standard case
of asymptotic t-statistics. Subsection 2.2 formalizes it in the general case.
2.1. The case of asymptotic t-statistics. Asymptotic t-statistics are among the
most widely-used statistics to compute confidence regions or carry out hypothesis tests.
The Neyman-Pearson theoretical justification of an asymptotic t-test of size α is that the
t-statistic has a probability 1 − α m.a.e. to be between the α/2 and 1 − α/2 quantiles
of a standard Gaussian distribution under the test hypothesis. However, once computed,
the t-statistic is in the non-rejection region with probability 0 or 1, i.e., it is or it is not
in the non-rejection region. Thus, if the result of this first test leads the econometrician
to compute a second t-test of size α, the corresponding t-statistic cannot typically have
a probability of 1− α m.a.e. to be between the α/2 and 1− α/2 quantiles of a standard
Gaussian distribution under the test hypothesis. The observation of the first t-statistic
has removed a part of the randomness of the second t-statistic. Except in a few cases (e.g.,
Gourie´roux and Monfort, 1989/1996, chap. 19), t-statistics computed on the same data
set are not independent. This means that the Neyman-Pearson theoretical justification
does not hold for the second t-test. Because of the duality between hypothesis testing
and confidence regions in the Neyman-Pearson theory, there is the same concern for
confidence intervals based on t-statistics. Subsection 2.2 proves that this concern about
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the Neyman-Pearson theoretical justification of confidence regions and tests is not limited
to t-statistics.
2.2. The general case. Assumption 1 sets up the minimal elements of the Neyman-
Pearson theory that are necessary to formalize multiple use of the same data.
Assumption 1. (a) Let (Ω, EΩ) be a measurable space where EΩ denotes a σ-algebra of
Ω. (b) Let θ0 ∈ Θ be the unknown parameter, where Θ denotes the parameter space. (c)
Let X1:T be some data, i.e., a measurable mapping from (Ω, EΩ) to a measurable space
(ST ,ST ), where T and ST denote the sample size and the observation space, respectively.
Remark 2. There is no restriction on the parameter space Θ, so that it can be Euclidean
or infinite-dimensional. 
Definitions 1 and 2 recall the definition of Neyman-Pearson confidence regions and tests.
Definition 1 (Neyman-Pearson confidence region). Let α ∈ [0, 1], and P a probability
measure on (Ω, EΩ). Under P, a 1−α Neyman-Pearson confidence region C1−α,T is a mea-
surable random subset of the parameter space that has a probability of at least 1−α m.a.e.
to contain the unknown parameter θ0, i.e., (i) for all ω ∈ Ω, C1−α,T (X1:T (ω)) ⊂ Θ, (ii)
{x1:T ∈ ST : θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (x1:T )} ∈ ST m.a.e., and (iii) P {ω ∈ Ω : θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (X1:T (ω))} >
1− α m.a.e.
Definition 2 (Neyman-Pearson test). Let H be a test hypothesis, and P a probability mea-
sure on (Ω, EΩ). Define the measurable decision space (D,P(D)) where D := {dH, dA},
and P(D) denotes the power set of D. The decisions dH and dA, respectively, correspond
to the non-rejection and the rejection of the test hypothesis H. Under P, a Neyman-
Pearson test of level α ∈ [0, 1] is a decision rule dT (.) that leads to the rejection of H
with a probability of at most α m.a.e. under H, i.e., a ST/P(D)-measurable function dT
m.a.e. s.t. P(dT (X1:T ) = dA) 6 α m.a.e., if H is true.
Remark 3. As indicated by the qualification “m.a.e.,” when no finite-sample distribution
is available, we consider the asymptotic limit superior (or limit inferior) of the outer
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(or inner) probability distribution. (see Remark 1 on p. 4). Thus, our setup covers
asymptotic Neyman-Pearson tests and confidence regions, and the case a` la Hoffmann-
Jørgensen (see Wellner and van der Vaart, 1996), in which finite-sample statistics are not
measurable although their limit is measurable. In the latter case, in Definitions 1 and 2,
P(θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (X1:T )) and P(dT (X1:T ) = dA), respectively, stand for lim infT→∞ P∗(θ0 ∈
C1−α,T (X1:T )) and lim supT→∞ P
∗(dT (X1:T ) = dA) where P∗ and P∗, respectively, denote
the inner and outer probabilities implied by P. 
Theorem 1 formalizes the concern raised by previous knowledge of realized data that
are not probabilistically independent from Neyman-Pearson confidence regions and tests.
Theorem 1 (Neyman-Pearson inadequacy). Let P be the unknown probability measure on
(Ω, EΩ), and {X1:T ∈ AT} ∈ EΩ a nonzero-probability event, i.e., P(X1:T ∈ AT ) = c > 0.
For all E ∈ E, define P(E|X1:T ∈ AT ) := P(E∩{X1:T∈AT })P(X1:T∈AT ) . Denote a Neyman-Pearson
1 − α confidence region for θ0 under P with C1−α,T , and a Neyman-Pearson test of level
α under P with d(.). Under Assumption 1,
i) if {X1:T ∈ AT} and {θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (X1:T )} are not independent m.a.e., then
P(θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (X1:T )|X1:T ∈ AT ) 6= P(θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (X1:T )) m.a.e.;
ii) if {X1:T ∈ S} and {dT (X1:T ) = dA} are not independent m.a.e., then
P(dT (X1:T ) = dA|X1:T ∈ AT ) 6= P(dT (X1:T ) = dA) m.a.e.
Proof. It is definition chasing, essentially. For (i) and (ii), respectively denote {θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (X1:T )}
and {dT (X1:T ) = dA} with E. By definition of independence between events, m.a.e.,
P(E ∩ {X1:T ∈ AT}) 6= P(E)P(X1:T ∈ AT ) (a)⇔ P(E∩{X1:T∈AT })P(X1:T∈AT ) 6= P(E)
(b)⇔ P(E|X1:T ∈
AT ) 6= P(E), where equivalences can be seen as follows. (a) By assumption, P(X1:T ∈
AT ) > 0. (b) By definition, P(E|X1:T ∈ AT ) := P(E∩{X1:T∈AT })P(X1:T∈AT ) . See Appendix B on p. 44
for more details regarding the possible approximation error. 
The key defining properties of a Neyman-Pearson confidence region and test are, re-
spectively, the probability that the confidence region contains the unknown parameter,
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and the probability of rejecting the hypothesis under the test hypothesis. Theorem 1
proves that these key defining properties are affected by the previous observation of a
nonzero-probability event {X1:T ∈ AT} that is not probabilistically independent from the
corresponding confidence region and test. Before the observation of {X1:T ∈ AT}, the
probability P of the Neyman-Pearson Definitions 1 and 2 is P m.a.e., but, after observa-
tion of {X1:T ∈ AT}, P is P(.|X1:T ∈ AT ) m.a.e.
A solution would be to systematically account for previous knowledge of the data by
determining conditional probability, such as P(.|X1:T ∈ AT ). However, most of the time,
this is operationally impossible, especially in nonexperimental fields. In nonexperimen-
tal fields, this previous knowledge can correspond to computed statistics or plots, but
also to historical events personally experienced or studied. For example, defining valid
Neyman-Pearson tests or confidence regions for an applied American econometrician who
studies the US economy appears an impossible task. Moreover, even if it was possible,
it would make criteria of validity of statistical discoveries path-dependent, and thus diffi-
cult to understand. Therefore, the Neyman-Pearson inference theory appears practically
inadequate for nonexperimental fields.
Remark 4. Because of our focus on multiple use of the same data, in this paper, we
present the operational impossibility to condition on previous knowledge of the realized
data as the source of the Neyman-Pearson inadequacy. In fact, if one makes the distinction
between unknown and random quantities as the Neyman-Pearson theory does (e.g., θ0 is
unknown, but constant), it is the realization of the data and not the knowledge of them
that matters. Thus, one needs to condition on all the data that have been realized prior
to the determination of the test statistics and confidence regions to be computed. When
only part of the data at use have been previously realized, we are back to Theorem 1
and the generic operational impossibility to determine conditional probability. When all
the data at use have been previously realized, the conditioning is trivial, but then tests
should should have zero probability type I error m.a.e., and, under additional but general
assumptions, C1−α,T (X1:T ) = Θ m.a.e. P-a.s. See Appendix C on p. 45. 
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3. Bayesian theory and multiple use of the same data
“In a strictly logical sense, this criticism of (practical) prior dependence on the data cannot be
refuted.”
Berger (1980/2006, p. 112).
As for Neyman-Pearson theory, multiple use of the same data is a challenge for Bayesian
inference theory. Subsection 3.1 explains the concern in the basic case in which Bayes’
formula holds, and subsection 3.2 formalizes it in the general case.
3.1. The basic case. Taken literally, Bayesian theory regards inference as a two-
stage game between nature and an econometrician (e.g., Ferguson, 1967; Borovkov, 1984/1998).
In the first stage, nature draws the parameter θ0 according to a prior distribution piθ0(.),
and then draws data X1:T according to a conditional probability density function (p.d.f.),
piX1:T |θ0(.|.). In the second stage, the econometrician makes inferences about the real-
ized parameter value θ0 given the sample at hand.
3 As usual in game theory, the p.d.f.
piX1:T |θ0(.|.) and piθ0(.) are common knowledge. Thus, the econometrician updates the prior
distribution, piθ0(.), thanks to data according to Bayes’ formula
piθ0|X1:T (θ|X1:T (ω)) =
piX1:T |θ0(X1:T (ω)|θ)piθ0(θ)∫
Θ
piX1:T |θ0(X1:T (ω)|θ˙)piθ0(θ˙)µ(dθ˙)
,
to obtain the posterior distribution piθ0|X1:T (.|X1:T (ω)).
But, after the p.d.f. of the unknown parameter given the data has been computed, the
data are known and fixed. Their randomness has disappeared. Thus, the econometrician
cannot learn anymore from them. If the Bayes formula is applied a second time to the
same data, the p.d.f. of data conditional on the unknown parameter is one, so that
the second posterior is equal to the first posterior. Mathematically, Bayesian updating
3To avoid additional notations, the random parameter θ0 is defined as the identity mapping on the
parameter space Θ, so that its realized value is also denoted by θ0.
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becomes
piX1:T |θ0,X1:T (X1:T (ω)|θ,X1:T (ω))piθ0|X1:T (θ|X1:T (ω))∫
Θ
piX1:T |θ0,X1:T (X1:T (ω)|θ˙, X1:T (ω))piθ0|X1:T (θ˙|X1:T (ω))µ(dθ˙)
=
1× piθ0|X1:T (θ|X1:T (ω))∫
Θ
1× piθ0|X1:T (θ˙|X1:T (ω))µ(dθ˙)
= piθ0|X1:T (θ|X1:T (ω)).
Therefore, Bayes inference theory cannot justify multiple use of the same data. Subsection
3.2 shows that the conclusion remains unchanged in the general case, in which densities
do not necessarily exist.
3.2. The general case. Assumption 2 defines the general structure of Bayesian inference
along the lines of Florens, Mouchart and Rolin (1990).4
Assumption 2. (a) Let (Ω×Θ, EΩ⊗EΘ,Π) be a probability space, where (Θ, EΘ) is the
parameter space, and where EΩ ⊗ EΘ denotes the product σ-algebra of the σ-algebras EΩ
and EΘ. (b) Let {FΩ,n}n>0 be a filtration in EΩ. Define a filtration {Fn}n>0 in EΩ ⊗ EΘ
s.t., for all n ∈ N, Fn = FΩ,n ⊗ {Θ, ∅}.
The filtration {Fn}n>0 corresponds to the accumulation of information that comes from
the sample space. In other words, Fn is the information set of the econometrician after n
Bayesian updates. Definition 3 reminds the general definition of posterior probabilities.
Definition 3 (Posterior probability). For all n ∈ N and B ∈ {Ω, ∅} ⊗ EΘ, the Fn-
posterior probability of B is the expectation of the indicator function lB conditional on
Fn, i.e., E(lB|Fn).
Implicitly, Definition 3 also defines priors as the distinction between a prior and a
posterior depends on the update of reference. After n Bayesian updates, E(.|Fn) is the
prior, while E(.|Fn+1) is the posterior.
Remark 5. The framework is general: We do not impose restrictions on the parameter
space Θ, or require the existence of regular conditional probabilities. 
4The main difference between their notations and our notations is the following. Unlike them, we do
not identify σ-algebras with their inverse image by the coordinate map. See Florens, Mouchart and
Rolin, 1990, p. 11, warning. Our choice makes the presentation less elegant, but it allows us to maintain
notational consistency within this paper.
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Assumption 3 specify the minimal additional ingredients necessary to study multiple
use of the same data.
Assumption 3. (a) Let X1:T be some data, i.e., a measurable mapping from (Ω, E) to
the measurable space (ST ,ST ), where ST denotes the observation space. (b) There exists
n1 ∈ N s.t. Fn1+1 = Fn1 ∨ σ(X1:T ), where σ(X1:T ) denotes the σ-algebra generated
by X1:T , and Fn1 ∨ [σ(X1:T ) ⊗ {Θ, ∅}] the σ-algebra generated by the union of Fn1 and
[σ(X1:T )⊗ {Θ, ∅}], i.e., Fn1 ∨ [σ(X1:T )⊗ {Θ, ∅}] := σ (Fn1 ∪ [σ(X1:T )⊗ {Θ, ∅}]).
Assumption 3(a) requires the existence of data, X1:T , while Assumption 3(b) requires
that update n1 comes from the use of the data X1:T . Theorem 2 formalizes the effect of
a second use of the same data X1:T .
Theorem 2 (Bayesian inadequacy). Let n2 ∈ [[n1 + 1,∞[[ s.t Fn2+1 = Fn2 ∨ [σ(X1:T ) ⊗
{Θ, ∅}]. Then under Assumptions 2 and 3, the Fn2+1-posterior probability and Fn2-
posterior probability are equal, i.e., for all B ∈ {Ω, ∅} ⊗ EΘ,
E(lB|Fn2+1) = E(lB|Fn2).
Proof. It is definition chasing. By definition, Fn2+1 := Fn2∨ [σ(X1:T )⊗{Θ, ∅}] := σ(Fn2∪
[σ(X1:T ) ⊗ {Θ, ∅}]) (a)= σ(Fn2)
(b)
= Fn2 , where equalities can be seen as follows. (a) By
Assumption 3(b), [σ(X1:T )⊗ {Θ, ∅}] ⊂ Fn2 . (b) Fn2 is itself a σ-algebra by definition of
a filtration. 
The update n1 + 1 corresponds to the first use of the data X1:T , while the update
n2 + 1 corresponds to the second use. Theorem 2 proves that the second use of the same
data does not increase the information set, Fn2 , and thus the posterior remains the same.
An immediate corollary of this result is the absence of formal Bayesian justification for
analyses, in which an econometrician claims to have obtained a different “posterior” after
a first use of the same data. Theorem 2 shows that such analyses are incompatible with
Bayesian inference theory.
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Remark 6. For brevity and relevance, we mainly consider the Neyman-Pearson and
Bayesian inadequacy when there is partial, and complete previous knowledge of the re-
alized data, respectively. However, in parallel, complete, and partial previous knowledge
causes Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian inadequacy, respectively. Complete previous knowl-
edge causes Neyman-Pearson inadequacy when the randomness needed to justify a new
test or a new confidence region has completely disappeared. For example, when one
wants a t-test of size α after computation of a 1−α confidence interval based on the same
statistic, the t-statistic is between the α/2 and 1 − α/2 quantiles with probability 0 or
1 because a confidence interval corresponds to the set of hypothesis that would not have
been rejected. See also Proposition 3 on p. 46, which can be seen as a formalization of
the case, in which all the data have been previously examined. Partial knowledge causes
Bayesian inadequacy when it is impossible to incorporate previous information through a
formal Bayesian updating. For example, Bayesian inference theory is typically inadequate
when partial previous knowledge corresponds to historical events personally experienced.
See also Savage (1954/1972, pp. 59–60) for more details about this inadequacy. 
As Neyman-Pearson theory, Bayesian inference theory is inadequate for multiple use
of the same data. Both theories rely on a randomness, which is disappearing as data
are used, so that multiple use of the same data appears difficult to justify. However, in
nonexperimental fields, multiple use of the same data is inescapable. Thus, the relevance of
Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian inference theories to nonexperimental fields is not obvious.
4. Elements of neoclassical inference theory
The purpose of this section is to introduce elements of a theory that is immune to
multiple use of the same data m.a.e., and that provides a common framework for point
estimation, confidence regions and hypothesis testing. There does not seem to exist such
an inference theory in the literature.
This section is organized as follows. Subsection 4.1 presents the main idea of the
neoclassical theory, subsection 4.2 its main elements, and subsection 4.3 proves that it is
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theoretically immune to multiple use the same data m.a.e. Hereafter, for simplicity, we
only consider the parameter space Θ to be an Euclidean space.
4.1. Main idea. The setup of the neoclassical inference theory is standard (e.g., Borovkov,
1984/1998, chap. 2). An econometrician wants to infer a constant and unknown param-
eter θ0 of an econometric model (Ω, EΩ,P). The parameter θ0 is assumed to belong to a
known parameter space, denoted Θ. The only difference between the unknown parameter,
θ0, and other elements of the parameter space Θ is that the former one equals a mapping
of the generating probability measure, P, i.e.,
θ0 =: G(P) (1)
where G(.) maps probability measures to elements of the parameter space Θ. The econo-
metrician does not know P, but has access to some data X1:T := (Xt)Tt=1 that are assumed
to be generated by the econometric model (Ω, EΩ,P). Thus, the econometrician approxi-
mates θ0 using the data X1:T , i.e., defines a proxy
θ∗T := HT (X1:T ) (2)
where HT is a mapping from the observation space ST to the parameter space Θ. Often,
HT (X1:T ) = G(PX1:T ), where PX1:T := 1T
∑T
t=1 δXt is the empirical measure with δXt
denoting the Dirac measure at Xt. We call θ
∗
T a finite-sample proxy of the unknown
parameter θ0.
Now, if there exist some data X•1:T with the same unconditional distribution as X1:T
(i.e., P◦X−11:T = P◦X•1:T−1) but independent from them, these data X•1:T induce an equally
informative finite-sample proxy of θ0
θ•T := HT (X
•
1:T ). (3)
Building on this remark, the idea of the neoclassical inference theory is to base inference
of θ0 on an approximation of the distribution of a generic finite-sample proxy of θ0 that
has the same unconditional distribution as θ∗T , but is independent from the data X1:T . We
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denote the generic finite-sample proxy with θ•T . In this paper, we take the finite-sample
proxy θ∗T (i.e., the choice of HT (.)) as given, in order to stay away from the question of
the properties of the generic proxy θ•T .
5
Example. (continued from p. 2). From equation (1), θ0 =
1
s
√
2pi
∫
R
x exp[−1
2
(x−θ0)2
s2
]dx
=
∫
Ω
X1(ω)P(dω) =: G(P). From equation (2), θ∗T := HT (X1:T ) := 1T
∑T
t=1Xt = XT .
From equation (3), θ•T := X
•
T . Assume that, as previously mentioned, the asymptotic
Gaussian approximation is used to approximate the distribution of θ•T . Then, the distri-
bution of the generic finite-sample proxy θ•T is N
(
XT (ω),
sT (X1:T (ω))√
T
)
m.a.e.

4.2. Definitions. We require the following assumptions, in addition to Assumption 1, to
outline the neoclassical theory.
Assumption 4. (a) Let P be the unknown probability measure on (Ω, E). (b) Let (Θ, EΘ)
be a measurable space s.t. Θ is a Borel subset of Rp with p ∈ N \ {0}, and EΘ denotes
the Borel σ-algebra on Θ. (c) Let U be a uniformly distributed random variable with
support [0, 1] on the probability space, (Ω, EΩ,P), s.t. X1:T and U are independent for all
T ∈ [[1,∞[[.
Assumption 4(c) is the only assumption that is new with respect to Neyman-Pearson
theory. Nevertheless, its novelty is limited as econometric reasoning (e.g., asymptotic
theory) and implementations of the Neyman-Pearson theory (e.g., bootstrap) often im-
plicitly require it. The random variable U is a randomization device that ensures the
existence of the generic finite-sample proxy θ•T . More generally, Assumption 4(c) ensure
the existence of a countable number of random variables with any probability distribution
(e.g., Kallenberg, 1997/2002, Lemmas 3.21 and 3.22). Such an assumption is innocuous.
We can always redefine the probability space (Ω, EΩ,P) as the product of an original
probability space with the probability space ([0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ), where B([0, 1]) and λ,
5This question, which can be seen as one of the main topic of the statistical and econometric literature,
corresponds to the study of the properties of what is called the estimator in the Neyman-Pearson theory.
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respectively, denote the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1] and the Lebesgue measure (e.g., Kallen-
berg, 1997/2002, pp. 111–112).
Thanks to Assumption 4(c), given a (data-based) finite-sample proxy of θ0, Lemma 1
proves the existence of a corresponding generic proxy of θ0.
Lemma 1 (Existence of a generic proxy). Let the finite-sample proxy of θ0 be θ
∗
T :=
HT (X1:T ), where HT is a measurable mapping from (ST ,ST ) to (Θ, EΘ). Under As-
sumptions 1 and 4, there exists a corresponding generic finite-sample proxy of θ0, i.e., a
measurable mapping θ•T from (Ω, EΩ) to (Θ, EΘ) that is independent from X1:T , but has
the same unconditional distribution as θ∗T .
Proof. This is an application of a known generalization of the standard inverse trans-
form method that is used to simulate random variables from a uniform distribution (e.g.,
Kallenberg, 1997/2002, p. 56, Lemma 3.22). By Assumption 4(b), Θ is a Borel space,
i.e., there exists a Borel measurable bijection h : Θ → A, with A ∈ B([0, 1]), s.t.
h−1 is also measurable. Denote the c.d.f. of h(θ∗T ) with Fh(θ∗T ) and put F
−1
h(θ∗T )
(u) :=
infz
{
z ∈ A : Fh(θ∗T )(z) > u
}
, ∀u ∈ [0, 1]. Then, under Assumption 4(a), for all B ∈ EΘ,
P(h−1(F−1h(θ∗T )(U)) ∈ B)
(a)
= P(F−1h(θ∗T )(U) ∈ h(B))
(b)
= P(h(θ∗T ) ∈ h(B))
(c)
= P(θ∗T ∈ B), where
(a) and (c) are a consequence of the bimeasurability and bijectivity of h(.), and (b) is an
application of the standard inverse transform method by Assumption 4(c). Now, again
by Assumption 4(c), U is independent from data. Thus, put θ•T := h
−1(F−1h(θ∗T )(U)). 
In this paper, the definitions of neoclassical estimators and confidence regions and test
are based on the generic proxy. To simplify their statements, we require the following
assumption.
Assumption 5. Denote the Borel σ-algebra on R with B(R). There is a EΘ/ER-measurable
p.d.f. fθ•T (.) s.t., for all B ∈ EΘ, P(θ•T ∈ B) =
∫
B
fθ•T (θ)µ(dθ) m.a.e., where µ is the
Lebesgue measure λ, or the counting measure ν.
By the Radon-Nikodyn theorem, Assumption 5 requires the distribution of the generic
finite-sample proxy P ◦ θ•T−1, or its approximation to be a probability measure dominated
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by the Lebesgue or the counting measure. In practice, because P ◦ θ•T−1 is unknown, it
requires the approximation of P ◦ θ•T−1 to be a probability measure dominated by the
Lebesgue or the counting measure. Instead of requiring the existence of fT (.), we could
apply the Lebesgue decomposition theorem to write m.a.e. the measure P ◦ θ•T−1 as the
sum of a continuous, a discreet and a singular measure. However, it would complicate
the upcoming definitions without much tangible gain. In particular, under Assumption
5, the neoclassical estimator is simply a maximizer of the p.d.f. fθ•T m.a.e.
Definition 4 (Neoclassical estimator). A neoclassical estimator, denoted θˇT , is a maxi-
mizer of the p.d.f. fθ•T m.a.e., i.e.,
θˇT ∈ arg max
θ∈Θ
fθ•T (θ) m.a.e.
Example. (continued)P(θ•T∈Br(θ))= 1[sT (X1:T (ω))/√T ]√2pi
∫
Br(θ)
exp
[
−1
2
(
θ˙−XT (ω)
sT (X1:T (ω))/
√
T
)2]
dθ˙ m.a.e.
Thus, the neoclassical estimate is the mode of N
(
XT (ω),
sT (X1:T (ω))√
T
)
, i.e., θˆT = XT (ω)
m.a.e. 
By Definition 4, a neoclassical estimator is an element of the parameter space Θ that
has the highest probability density to be the generic finite-sample proxy θ•T m.a.e. Thus, it
is a maximum-probability based estimator. In the neoclassical theory, confidence regions
are also maximum-probability based.
Definition 5 (Neoclassical confidence region). Denote the support of fθ•T with supp(fθ•T ),
i.e., supp(fθ•T ) := {θ ∈ Θ : fθ•T (θ) > 0}. A B(Θ)-measurable set, R1−α,T , is a neoclassical
confidence region of level 1− α with α ∈ [0, 1] if, and only if,
R1−α,T =
{
θ ∈ supp(fθ•T ) : fθ•T (θ) > kα,T
}
m.a.e.,
where kα,T := supk∈R
{
k :
∫
{θ∈Θ:fθ•
T
(θ)>k} fθ•T (θ)µ(dθ) > 1− α
}
.
Example. (continued) Because a Gaussian distribution is unimodal and symmetric with
respect to its mean, R1−α,T =
[
XT (ω)− sT (X1:T (ω))√T u1−α2 , XT (ω)−
sT (X1:T (ω))√
T
uα
2
]
m.a.e.,
where uα/2 denotes the α/2 quantile of a standard Gaussian distribution. 
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Remark 7. The existence of neoclassical confidence region is typically not a concern.
Appendix D on p. 49 proves the existence of neoclassical confidence regions under mild
assumptions. 
By construction, a neoclassical confidence region is an indicator of the confidence we
can have in a neoclassical estimate. It is the set of parameter values that are the closest
to being the neoclassical estimate, such that the whole set has a probability at least 1−α
to contain the generic finite-sample proxy θ•T m.a.e. Thus, a small connected neoclassical
confidence region indicates a well-separated estimate, which is reliable. In contrast, a
large neoclassical confidence region or a neoclassical confidence region that consists of the
union of disjoint sets indicates an unreliable estimate.
Remark 8. If the purpose of confidence regions is to indicate the confidence we can have in
an estimate, their neoclassical definition is more satisfactory than their Neyman-Pearson
definition (inadequacies caused by multiple use of the data and their past realization set
aside). The Neyman-Pearson definition of confidence regions is not about the estimate,
but about coverage. In particular, Neyman-Pearson confidence regions do not necessarily
contain the estimate. 
Remark 9. In Definition 5, the definition of neoclassical estimator is formally close to the
definition of Bayesian highest posterior density (HPD) sets (e.g., Berger, 1980/2006, sec.
4.3.2., Definition 5), although their theoretical justification and meaning are fundamen-
tally different. 
Although Definition 5 corresponds to a joint confidence region, marginal and condi-
tional neoclassical confidence regions can also be defined by considering the marginal and
conditional distribution of θ•T . From neoclassical confidence regions, we define neoclassical
tests.
Definition 6 (Neoclassical test). Let H : θ0 = θ˙ be a test hypothesis, and R1−α,T a 1− α
neoclassical confidence region, where α ∈ [0, 1]. As in Definition 2, denote the decision
space with D := {dH, dA}. A neoclassical test of level α for H is a decision rule, denoted
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dT , s.t. if
θ˙ ∈ R1−α,T m.a.e.
then dT = dH; otherwise dT = dA.
Definition 6 leads the econometrician to reject hypotheses that do not correspond to
the set of parameter values with the highest probability density of being equal to the
generic proxy θ•T m.a.e. By Definitions 5, all elements in a neoclassical confidence region
have a higher probability density of being equal to the generic finite-sample proxy than
the ones outside it m.a.e.
Example. (continued) If θ˙ ∈
[
XT (ω)− sT (X1:T (ω))√T u1−α2 , XT (ω)−
sT (X1:T (ω))√
T
uα
2
]
, then we
do not reject the test hypothesis, i.e., dT = dH. Note that, in this example, the neo-
classical estimate, confidence region and test are practically equivalent to their usual
Neyman-Pearson counterparts, although their theoretical justification is different. Nev-
ertheless, there are Neyman-Pearson confidence regions and tests that do not practically
correspond to neoclassical confidence regions or tests. E.g. under the assumption that
data X1:T have not been realized prior to the decision to compute the confidence inter-
val
]
−∞, XT (ω)− sT (X1:T (ω))√T u.5+α2
]
∪
[
XT (ω)− sT (X1:T (ω))√T u.5−α2 ,∞
[
, the latter is a valid
1− α Neyman-Pearson confidence region, while it is not a neoclassical confidence region.

Remark 10. While the neoclassical definition of confidence regions appears more satisfac-
tory than their Neyman-Pearson definition (see Remark 8, p. 17), the reverse seems to be
true for tests (inadequacies caused by multiple use of the data and their past realization
set aside). Unlike Neyman-Pearson tests, neoclassical tests do not directly control the
probability of making an error, so that their outcome should be understood in terms of
evidence in favor of, or against the hypothesis. However, it should be noted that Neyman-
Pearson tests control the probability of type I error only ex ante: after computation of the
test statistic, the probability of error is 0 or 1. Moreover, work in progress by the authors
ECONOMETRIC INFERENCE AND MULTIPLE USE OF THE SAME DATA 19
suggest that the direct control of type I error can be regained within the neoclassical
theory. 
Remark 11. When µ = λ, the precise choice of fθ•T is typically crucial for Definitions
4-6 : a modifications of the p.d.f. fθ•T on a λ-null set yields another p.d.f. of P ◦ θ•T−1
w.r.t. λ m.a.e. that can lead to a completely different estimate, confidence region and
result of a test (see subsection 5.2). This peculiarity, from which we take advantage
in subsection 5.2 (see Remark 17, p. 31), also arises in Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian
theories (e.g., Gourie´roux and Monfort, 1989/1996, sec. 7.A.2). Nevertheless, under the
mild assumption that θ ∈ Θ is a Lebesgue point, by Lebesgue’s differentiation theorem
(e.g., Folland, 1984/1999, Theorem 3.21), fθ•T (θ) is often s.t. fθ•T (θ) = limr↓0
P(θ•T∈Br(θ))
λ(Br(θ))
m.a.e., where Br(θ) denotes a ball in Θ centered at θ with radius r > 0. 
Remark 12. As Definitions 4, 5 and 6 respectively indicate, neoclassical estimators, con-
fidence regions and tests are not random m.a.e., and do not depend on the realized data
m.a.e. In the examples, their dependence on the realized data is only due to the approx-
imation error. 
4.3. Neoclassical theory and multiple use of the same data. The upcoming The-
orem 3 investigates the adequacy of the neoclassical theory when data have already been
used, and thus are known. Because the neoclassical theory is based on the distribution of
the generic proxy θ•T , it is sufficient to investigate the effect of previous knowledge of the
realized data on this distribution.
Theorem 3 (Neoclassical adequacy). Under Assumptions 1 and 4, for all B ∈ EΘ,
i) for all AT ∈ ST , {X1:T ∈ AT} and {θ•T ∈ B} are independent m.a.e., i.e.,
P ({θ•T ∈ B} ∩ {X1:T ∈ AT}) = P(θ•T ∈ B)P(X1:T ∈ AT ) m.a.e.;
ii) for all AT ∈ ST s.t. P(X1:T ∈ AT ) > 0,
P(θ•T ∈ B|X1:T ∈ AT ) = P(θ•T ∈ B) m.a.e.
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Proof. It is a consequence of Lemma 1. i) By Lemma 1, θ•T and X1:T are independent,
so that all events in σ(θ•T ) and σ(X1:T ) are independent (e.g., Kallenberg, 1997/2002, p.
50). ii) Using (i), replace in the proof of Theorem 1, the nonequal sign by an equal sign,
and set E = {θ•T ∈ B}. 
Theorem 3 shows that the distribution of the generic proxy θ•T is immune to previous
knowledge (or realization) of the data. Then, the inadequacy of neoclassical confidence
regions and tests follow.
Corollary 1 (Neoclassical confidence region and test adequacy). Let R1−α,T be a neo-
classical 1−α confidence region for θ0. Under Assumptions 1 and 4, for all AT ∈ ST s.t.
P(X1:T ∈ AT ) > 0,
P(θ•T ∈ R1−α,T |X1:T ∈ AT ) = P(θ•T ∈ R1−α,T ) m.a.e.
Proof. Apply Theorem 3(ii) putting B = R1−α,T . 
Example. (continued) For clarity, we now explicitly distinguish between the fixed ω ∈ Ω
due to the approximation error and the random elements of the sample space. We denote
the latter ones with ω˜. By Theorem 3 (i), m.a.e.,
P { ω˜ ∈ Ω : θ•T (ω˜) ∈ B| ω˜ ∈ Ω : X1:T (ω˜) ∈ AT}
= P(θ•T ∈ Br(θ)|X1:T ∈ AT ) = P(θ•T ∈ B) = P {ω˜ ∈ Ω : θ•T (ω˜) ∈ B}
=
1
[sT (X1:T (ω))/
√
T ]
√
2pi
∫
B
exp
−1
2
(
θ˙ −XT (ω)
sT (X1:T (ω))/
√
T
)2λ(dθ˙)
By Corollary 1, m.a.e.,
P
{
ω˜∈ Ω:θ•T (ω˜)∈
[
XT (ω)−sT (X1:T (ω))√
T
u1−α
2
,XT (ω)−sT (X1:T (ω))√
T
uα
2
]∣∣∣∣ ω˜∈Ω:X1:T (ω˜)∈AT}
= P(θ•T ∈ R1−α,T |X1:T ∈ AT ) = P(θ•T ∈ R1−α,T )
= P
{
ω˜ ∈ Ω : θ•T (ω˜) ∈
[
XT (ω)− sT (X1:T (ω))√
T
u1−α
2
, XT (ω)− sT (X1:T (ω))√
T
uα
2
]}
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The distinction between the fixed ω and the varying ω˜ is essential. The fixed ω can be
ignored as long as the approximation error is negligible, i.e., the approximation is justified.

Remark 13. Corollary 1(ii) does not mean or imply that, for all AT ∈ ST , limT→∞ P(θ•T ∈
R1−α,T |X1:T ∈ AT ) = limT→∞ P(θ•T ∈ R1−α,T ). First, in the neoclassical theory, approx-
imation errors do not necessarily come from asymptotic approximation (see Remark 1).
Second, even in the case, in which the whole approximation error would come from an
asymptotic approximation, Corollary 1(ii) only implies independence between X1:∞ and
any neoclassical confidence region R1−α deduced from limT→∞ ̂P ◦ θ•T−1, where ̂P ◦ θ•T−1
denotes an approximation of the distribution of the generic proxy θ•T . E.g., in the Exam-
ple, ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 d∼ N
(
XT (ω),
sT (X1:T )√
T
)
, so that limT→∞ ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 = δθ0 P-a.s., which, in turn,
implies, R1−α,∞ = {θ0} P-a.s. Therefore, {ω˜ ∈ Ω : θ0 ∈ R1−α,∞} = {ω˜ ∈ Ω : θ0 ∈ {θ0}}
has probability one, and is independent from the data X1:∞. Note that, in the Neyman-
Pearson theory, we would need to consider limT→∞ P
{
θ0 ∈
[
XT − sT (X1:T )√T u1−α2 , XT −
sT (X1:T )√
T
uα
2
]}
=
1− α, where
[
XT − sT (X1:T )√T u1−α2 , XT −
sT (X1:T )√
T
uα
2
]
depends on the data, and is random
even asymptotically. This difference between the two theories should help to understand
why, in the Example, the same finite-sample confidence interval depends on the data
m.a.e. for the Neyman-Pearson theory, while it is does not depend on the data m.a.e. for
the neoclassical theory. 
Remark 14. In this paper, the generic proxy θ•T is introduced for expository purpose,
i.e., to allow the use of probability symbolism. From a strict logical point of view, the
immunity of the unconditional distribution of θ∗T to multiple use of the same data is all
that is needed for the neoclassical adequacy: by definition the unconditional distribution
of θ∗T is about all the possible values of θ
∗
T induced by all the possible samples that could
have been observed. In other words, the key difference between the Neyman-Pearson and
Bayesian theories on the one hand, and the neoclassical theory on the other hand is that,
in the latter, inference exclusively relies on a unconditional distribution m.a.e., while, in
the other, inference relies on the realized data, even m.a.e. 
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The probabilistic statements, on which neoclassical estimators, confidence regions and
tests are based, are immune to previous information about the data, and thus to multiple
use of the same data m.a.e. To our knowledge, the neoclassical theory is the first general
inference theory immune to multiple use of the same data m.a.e.
5. A neoclassical point of view on some calibration and econometric
practices.
This section aims at presenting some prominent practices from the point of view of
the neoclassical inference theory. The elementary version of the theory outlined in the
subsection 4.2 is sufficient for this purpose. By-products of the current section are ex-
amples of implementation of the neoclassical theory, novel theoretical justifications for
the presented calibration and econometric practices, and a standard-error adjustment to
account for approximation errors.
Subsection 5.1 discusses requirements for proxies and approximations of their distribu-
tion. Subsection 5.2 presents choices of proxies and of approximations that correspond to
different econometric and calibration practices. Subsection 5.3 assesses the most common
econometric practice through Monte-Carlo simulations, and presents the standard-error
adjustment. Because, in this section, we discuss the choice of approximations, we distin-
guish between the distribution of the generic proxy P◦θ•T−1, and its chosen approximation,
which we denote ̂P ◦ θ•T−1(.) =
∫
.
fˆθ•T (θ)µ(dθ).
5.1. On generic proxies and approximations of their distribution. An implemen-
tation of the neoclassical theory requires two inputs: a generic proxy and an approximation
of its distribution. These inputs do not have to satisfy any particular criteria other than
being considered a proxy of θ0, and an approximation of P ◦ θ•T−1, respectively. In partic-
ular, the neoclassical theory does not require consistency of any of the two: consistency is
about situations where the number of observations can be infinitely increased, while prac-
tice is necessarily based on a bounded number of them. Nevertheless, hereafter, except
in the subsection 5.2.1 about calibration, we focus on asymptotically normal proxies and
consistent approximations, so that we can rely on insights from the asymptotic theory:
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the proxy typically corresponds to what is called an estimator in the Bayesian or Neyman-
Pearson theory. The following Assumption 6 requires asymptotic normality of θ•T , which
is a property of most estimators considered in the Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian theories
(e.g., Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003).
Assumption 6 (Asymptotic normality of θ•T ). The generic proxy of θ0 is asymptotically
normal, i.e., (by Assumption 4(c)) there exist a random variable ξ•, and a sequence of
random variables (R•T )
∞
T=1 on (Ω, EΩ) s.t.
θ•T = θ0 +
ξ•
T 1/2
+R•T
where P ◦ ξ•−1 d∼ N (0,Σ 12 ), and R•T = oP(T−1/2), as T →∞.
Assumption 6 means that the generic proxy θ•T asymptotically converges to θ0 as a
Gaussian random variable centered at θ0 with a standard deviation that goes to zero at
rate
√
T . We could weaken Assumption 6 to allow rates of convergence different from
√
T ,
or to allow different distributions for ξ• (e.g., Dickey-Fuller distributions), but it would
complicate the presentation. The following Assumption 7 requires the approximation of
the distribution of the generic proxy to be consistent.
Assumption 7 (Consistency of ̂P ◦ θ•T−1). The approximation of the distribution of the
generic proxy is consistent, i.e., as T →∞,
ρ
(
̂P ◦ θ•T−1,P ◦ θ•T−1
)
P→ 0,
where ρ(., .) denotes a metric on the space of probability measures on (Θ, EΘ).
Assumption 7 means that the distribution of the generic proxy and its approximation
converge to each other as the number of observations increases. In Appendix F, we
verify Assumption 7 for the approximations considered in this paper. In practice, the
distribution of the generic proxy, P ◦ θ•T−1, is typically unknown, so that Assumption 7
cannot be directly verified. Nevertheless, the asymptotic limit of P ◦ θ•T−1 is often known,
so that the following lemma provides a usable criterion for checking Assumption 7.
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Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 4, if there exists a probability measure P ◦ θ•∞−1 on
(Θ, EΘ) s.t., as T →∞,
(a) ρ
(
̂P ◦ θ•T−1,P ◦ θ•∞−1
)
P→ 0 and
(b) ρ(P ◦ θ•∞−1,P ◦ θ•T−1) P→ 0,
then ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 is a consistent approximation of P ◦ θ•T−1, i.e., Assumption 7 holds.
Proof. Triangle inequality yields ρ
(
̂P ◦ θ•T−1,P ◦ θ•T−1
)
6 ρ( ̂P ◦ θ•T−1,P ◦ θ•∞−1) + ρ(P ◦
θ•∞
−1,P ◦ θ•T−1), where the two terms of the RHS go to zero in probability as T →∞ by
(a) and (b), respectively. 
Example. (continued) Let ρ be the Prokhorov metric on the space of probability mea-
sures on (Θ, EΘ). The Prokhorov metric generates the topology of the convergence in
law (e.g., Billingsley, 1968/1999, pp. 72–73), which, in turn, corresponds to the point-
wise convergence of cumulative distribution functions (c.d.f.) at continuity points of the
limiting c.d.f. (Portmanteau theorem). Denote the c.d.f. of the Gaussian distribution
N (τ, s) with N(.; τ ; s). Then, for all θ ∈ Θ \ {θ0}, limT→∞N(θ; θ0; s√T ) = l[θ0,∞[(θ), be-
cause N(θ; θ0;
s√
T
) = N(
√
T θ−θ0
s
; 0; 1), and limT→∞
√
T θ−θ0
s
= −∞, if θ < θ0, and ∞
otherwise. Similarly, for all θ ∈ Θ \ {θ0}, limT→∞N(θ;XT ; sT (X1:T (ω))√T ) = l[θ0,∞[(θ), and
limT→∞ l[XT ,∞[(θ) = l[θ0,∞[(θ) P-a.s. (see also Appendix F.2.1, Proposition 6 on p. 61)
Thus, by Lemma 2, δXT (ω) and N
(
XT (ω),
sT (X1:T (ω))√
T
)
are consistent approximations of
the distribution of the generic proxy X
•
T , N (θ0, s√T ). 
Remark 15. Unlike for Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian theories, implementations of the
elementary version of the neoclassical inference theory presented in this paper seem to
always rely on an approximation, the approximation of the distribution of the generic
proxy. This is a disadvantage of the elementary version of the neoclassical theory. How-
ever, firstly, most of econometric practices rely on approximations: implementation of
the Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian theories typically requires asymptotic (e.g. CLT) or
computational (e.g., Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithms) approximations. Secondly,
in some particular cases, we can bound the approximation error in probability, or even
derive the exact distribution of ̂P ◦ θ•T−1, and of ρ( ̂P ◦ θ•T−1,P ◦ θ•T−1) : see Appendix
ECONOMETRIC INFERENCE AND MULTIPLE USE OF THE SAME DATA 25
E on p. 51. Thirdly, in practice, there is a trade-off between approximations and the
approximative assumptions that are needed to avoid the (explicit) approximations. 
5.2. Some practices in neoclassical terms. In this subsection, we frame some cali-
bration and econometric practices in terms of the neoclassical theory, so that they are
provided with a theoretical foundation immune to multiple use of the same data m.a.e.
For convenience and brevity, we present the practices according to the kind of approxi-
mations of P ◦ θ•T−1 they rely on. Thus, practices that combine different approximations
(e.g., mix of calibration and econometrics in Canova, 2007, chap. 7) are only indirectly
treated. Appendix F studies the asymptotic limit of the approximations considered in this
subsection, while Table 5 in Appendix G on p. 65 provides a panoramic view of them.
5.2.1. Model-calibration approximations. By calibration, we mean the more or less for-
mal process through which the parameter values of a model are selected in view of data.
In finance and economics, this process often correspond to the minimization of some
goodness-of-fit measure, or to the choice of estimates from various existing empirical
studies. While model calibration is used in many fields (e.g., Oreskes, Shrader-Frechette
and Belitz, 1994), it has become common in economics and finance with the development
of general-equilibrium models (Johansen, 1960; Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Shoven and
Walley, 1984) and derivatives pricing, respectively. We distinguish two types of calibra-
tion: plain calibration and criterion-adjusted calibration.
Plain calibration. In plain calibration, the selected parameter values are just plugged in
the model in lieu of the unknown parameter θ0. No information about potential calibration
error or model-specification error is reported. Plain calibration is widely used to price
derivatives in finance (e.g., Cont, 2010, p. 1217). If the selected parameter values are
assumed to be a realization of a random variable θ∗T,C , under Assumptions 1 and 4, plain
calibration can be regarded as an implementation of the neoclassical theory s.t.
• the generic proxy θ•T,C is a random variable that has the same unconditional dis-
tribution as θ∗T,C , i.e., θ
•
T,C = F
−1
θ∗T,C
(U•C) where F
−1
θ∗T,C
denotes the inverse of the
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unconditional c.d.f. of θ∗T,C , and U
•
C a random variable uniformly distributed on
[0, 1] that is independent from the data;
• the approximation of the unconditional distribution of the proxy is the unit point
mass at the selected parameter value θ∗T,C(ω), i.e., for all θ ∈ Θ,
fˆθ•T (θ) = l{θ∗T,C(ω)}(θ) with µ = ν.
Then, by Definitions 4 and 5, both the neoclassical estimate and confidence region cor-
respond to the calibrated value, i.e., θˇT = θ
∗
T,C(ω) and R1−α,T = {θ∗T,C(ω)} m.a.e. If the
selected parameter value is close to θ0 (e.g., the proxy θ
∗
T,C is consistent and the number of
observations T is large as in Proposition 5(i) in Appendix F.1), plain calibration may be
sufficient. However, in economics and finance, this is not often the case, so that indication
of the potential calibration error and model-specification error are often needed.
Criterion-adjusted calibration. By criterion-adjusted calibration, we mean a plain cal-
ibration accompanied by indications of calibration error and model-specification error
based on nonstatistical criteria. The indication of calibration error comes from the deter-
mination of a range of plausible values for the model parameter. The indication of model-
specification error comes from the computation of measures of discrepancy between the
calibrated model and the data (e.g., difference between moments of the calibrated model
and moments of the data).
To cast criterion-adjusted calibration as an implementation of the neoclassical theory,
it is useful to introduce new notation. We denote the model parameter and the measures
of discrepancy with β and ∆, respectively. We also denote the selected value for β with
β∗T,C , and the measure of discrepancy implied by β
∗
T,C with ∆
∗
T,C . The parameter β of
the model of interest are not to be confused with the global parameter θ := (β′ ∆′)′
. The determination of the range of plausible values for β and acceptable values for ∆
can be formalized by a positive criterion function u : (θ, θ˙) 7→ u(θ, θ˙), which indicates the
adequacy between its two arguments, and which equal zero outside Θ2. The criterion
function u is maximized when its two arguments are equal, i.e., for all θ˙ ∈ Θ and θ ∈
Θ\{θ˙}, u(θ, θ˙) 6 u(θ˙, θ˙). With this notation, and under the assumption that the following
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quantities exist, criterion-adjusted calibration can be regarded as an implementation of
the neoclassical theory s.t.
• the generic proxy is θ•T,CC := F−1θ•T,CC |θ•T,C (U
•
CC), where Fθ•T,CC |θ•T,C is a conditional
c.d.f. s.t. Fθ•T,CC |θ•T,C (.) :=
∫ .
−∞
u(θ,θ•T,C)∫
Θ u(θ˙,θ
•
T,C)λ(dθ˙)
λ(dθ) with ]−∞, θ] :=]−∞, θ1]×]−
∞, θ2]×· · ·×]−∞, θp] for (θ1 θ2 θ3 · · · θp)′ := θ ∈ Θ, and where U•CC is a random
variable uniformly distributed on [0, 1] that is independent from the data and θ•T,C ;
• the approximation of the distribution of the generic proxy θ•T,CC is the normalized
criterion function, i.e., for all θ ∈ Θ,
fˆθ•T (θ) ∝ u(θ, θ∗T,C(ω)) with µ = λ.
5.2.2. Gaussian approximation. The Gaussian approximation is one of the most-widely
used approximations. Under the assumption that the unconditional distribution of the
t-statistic
√
T Σˆ
− 1
2
T (θ
∗
T,G − θ0) converges asymptotically to a standard Gaussian N (0, I),
econometricians typically deduce univariate confidence regions and sets of nonrejected
point hypotheses,
[
θ∗T,G,k − sˆT,G,k,k√T u1−α/2, θ∗T,G,k −
sˆT,G,k,k√
T
uα/2
]
, where θ∗T,G,k, sˆ
2
T,G,k,k and
uα/2, respectively, denote the k-th element of the random vector θ
∗
T,G, the k-th diagonal
element of the matrix ΣˆT , and the α/2 quantile of a standard univariate Gaussian N (0, 1).
As in the Example of this paper, such practice can be regarded as an implementation of
the neoclassical theory s.t.
• the generic proxy θ•T,G is a random variable that has the same unconditional dis-
tribution as θ∗T,G, i.e., θ
•
T,G = F
−1
θ∗T
(U•G) where F
−1
θ∗T,G
denotes the inverse of the
unconditional c.d.f. of θ∗T,G, and U
•
G a random variable uniformly distributed on
[0, 1] that is independent from the data;
• the approximation of the unconditional distribution of the proxy is the Gauss-
ian distribution centered at θ∗T,G(ω) with variance-covariance matrix the diagonal
matrix of the diagonal elements of ΣˆT , i.e., for all θ ∈ Θ,
fˆθ•T (θ) ∝ exp
[
−T
2
(θ − θ∗T,G(ω))′diag(ΣˆT (ω))−1(θ − θ∗T,G(ω))
]
(4)
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with µ = λ, and where diag(ΣˆT (ω)) is the diagonal matrix that has the same
diagonal elements as ΣˆT (ω).
In the Appendix F, we show that the approximation (4) is consistent under Assumptions
1, 4 and 6. (see Proposition 6 in Appendix F.2)
5.2.3. Laplace approximation and “Bayesian” practice. In most econometric practices,
the unknown parameter θ0 is approximated by a maximizer θ
∗
T,L of a converging objective
function QT (X1:T , θ), i.e.,
θ∗T,L ∈ arg max
θ∈Θ
QT (X1:T , θ) (5)
where, as T → ∞, supθ∈Θ ‖QT (X1:T , θ) − Q(θ)‖ = oP(1) with θ0 = arg maxθ∈ΘQ(θ).
See Bierens (1981), Amemiya (1985, chap. 4), Gallant and White (1988), Newey and
McFadden (1994), and Po¨tscher and Prucha (1997), all of which follow from earlier con-
tributions by Wald (1950), Malinvaud (1964/1970, chap. 9; 1970), and Jennrich (1969).
If TQT (X1:T , θ) is a log-likelihood LT (X1:T , θ), for all x1:T ∈ ST and θ ∈ Θ, the function
(x1:T , θ) 7→ eLT (x1:T ,θ) (6)
is numerically equal to the Bayesian distribution of the data X1:T conditional on θ0,
denoted piX1:T |θ0(x1:T |θ) (see subsection 3.1). Thus, by analogy, often motivated by the
Laplace approximation, several papers (e.g., Zellner, 1997; Kim, 2002; Yin, 2009) have
used the function
(x1:T , θ) 7→ eTQT (x1:T ,θ) (7)
in lieu of piX1:T |θ0(.|.), even when the former is not numerically equal to the latter. Then,
they consider that the Bayesian posterior distribution piθ0|X1:T (θ|X1:T (ω)) equals
eTQT (X1:T (ω),θ)w(θ)∫
Θ
eTQT (X1:T (ω),θ˙)w(θ˙)λ(dθ˙)
(8)
where w : Θ 7→ R+ is a function that they regard as the Bayesian prior piθ0(.). As
previously noticed (e.g., Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003), such a practice is not in line
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with Bayesian theory, even if we set aside the invalidation due to multiple use of the
same data: approximations are not compatible with Bayesian inference theory, which
requires an econometrician to know exactly the distribution of the data conditional on
true parameter (Savage, 1954/1972, pp. 59–60). However, such a practice is in line
with the neoclassical inference theory whether the function (7) is numerically equal to
piX1:T |θ0(.|.) or not.
Under general assumptions, a strand of literature that goes back at least to Laplace
(1774/1878) has shown that (8) is a consistent approximation of the unconditional distri-
bution of θ∗T,WL. See literature on consistency of Bayesian posteriors (e.g., Doob, 1949),
and the Bernstein-von Mises theorem (e.g., Le Cam, 1953, 1958; Chen, 1985; Kim, 1998;
Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003), which implies consistency under P (see Appendix F.2.3
on p. 62). We distinguish three types of Laplace approximations: plain Laplace ap-
proximation, weighted Laplace approximation, and criterion-adjusted weighted Laplace
approximation. For brevity, we do not treat the plain Laplace approximation separately
from the weighted Laplace approximation, as the former is a particular case of the latter
with w(θ) = 1, for all θ ∈ Θ.
Plain and weighted Laplace approximation. The neoclassical theory justifies practices
that treats (8) as a Bayesian posterior, and report the counterpart of a mode and of an
HPD region. Such practices can be seen as an implementation of the neoclassical theory
s.t.
• the generic proxy θ•T,WL is a random variable that has the same unconditional
distribution as θ∗T,WL := arg maxθ∈Θ e
TQT (X1:T (ω),θ)w(θ), i.e., θ•T,WL = F
−1
θ∗T,WL
(U•WL)
where F−1θ∗T,WL denotes the inverse of the unconditional c.d.f. of θ
∗
T,WL, and U
•
WL a
random variable uniformly distributed on [0, 1] that is independent from the data;
• the approximation of the unconditional distribution of the proxy is the expression
(8) viewed as a function of θ, i.e., for all θ ∈ Θ,
fˆθ•T (θ) ∝ eTQT (X1:T (ω),θ)w(θ) with µ = λ.
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From a neoclassical point of view, w(.) weights the evidence from data. Mathematically,
it corresponds to a change of measure from the plain Laplace approximation, ̂P ◦ θ•T,L−1,
to the weighted Laplace approximation, ̂P ◦ θ•T,WL−1, i.e., for all θ ∈ Θ,
w(θ) =
d( ̂P ◦ θ•T,WL−1)
d( ̂P ◦ θ•T,L−1)
(θ).
The weighting function w(.) allows to incorporate additional information in the proxy of
θ0. While, in Bayesian theory, the dependance of a prior on data is typically problematic,
in the neoclassical theory, the weighting function w(.) can depend on the data. The
neoclassical theory only requires θ•T,WL and the integral of (8) to be considered a proxy of
θ0, and an approximation of P◦θ•T,WL−1, respectively. Thus, in particular, the neoclassical
theory provides a theoretical foundation to the practice called parametric empirical Bayes
(Morris, 1983). Petrone, Rousseau, Scricciolo (2014) present conditions under which the
weighted Laplace approximation (8) is a consistent approximation of P ◦ θ•T,WL−1 when
w(.) depends on data through an estimated hyperparameter.
Criterion-adjusted weighted Laplace approximation. When (8) is treated as if it was a
Bayesian posterior, the counterpart of a mode and of an HPD region are not always re-
ported. Instead, the econometrician chooses a utility function (i.e., opposite of a loss
function), u : (θe, θ) 7→ u(θe, θ), and then maximizes w.r.t. θe the expected utility∫
Θ
u(θe, θ)
eTQT (X1:T (ω),θ)w(θ)∫
eTQT (X1:T (ω),θ˙)w(θ˙)λ(dθ˙)
λ(dθ). If u(., .) is nonnegative (see upcoming Remark 16),
such a practice can be seen as an implementation of the neoclassical theory s.t.
• the generic proxy is θ•T,CWL := F−1θ•T,CWL|θ•T,WL(U
•
CWL) where Fθ•T,CWL|θ•T,WL(.) :=∫ .
−∞
u(θ,θ•T,WL)∫
Θ u(θ˙,θ
•
T,WL)λ(dθ˙)
λ(dθ), and where U•CWL is a random variable uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, 1] that is independent from the data and θ•T,WL;
• the approximation of the distribution of the generic proxy θ•T,CWL is the expected
criterion function u, i.e., for all θ ∈ Θ,
fˆθ•T (θ) ∝
∫
Θ
u(θ, θ˙)eTQT (X1:T (ω),θ˙)w(θ˙)λ(dθ˙) with µ = λ. (9)
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In Appendix F, we show that the criterion-adjusted weighted Laplace approximation (9)
is consistent under general assumptions. The Bayesian approach and the neoclassical
approach based on the criterion-adjusted weighted Laplace approximation (9) are fun-
damentally different, although they are numerically equivalent when TQT (X1:T , θ) is a
log-likelihood (and the data have not been previously used). For Bayesian inference the-
ory, an econometrician faces a known probabilized uncertainty of a random parameter θ0,
while from a neoclassical perspective an econometrician faces an estimated probabilized
uncertainty of a random proxy of a constant parameter θ0. Thus, the neoclassical theory
acknowledges the existence of an “unmeasurable” uncertainty described by Knight (1921,
chap. 7–8).
Remark 16. In this paper, we assume nonnegative criterion functions to remain within the
framework of the elementary version of the neoclassical theory presented in section 4. This
requirement limits the type of neoclassical confidence regions considered in this paper.
Nevertheless, under the mild assumption that inf(θ˙,θ¨)∈Θ2 u(θ˙, θ¨) > −∞, this requirement
is without loss of generality for neoclassical point estimation: we can define the criterion
function u˜(θe, θ) = u(θe, θ)− inf(θ˙,θ¨)∈Θ2 u(θ˙, θ¨) which yields the same point estimate. 
Remark 17. As explained in the introduction of this subsection, our presentation does
not present hybrid practices, so that we do not explicitly cover the diversity of the econo-
metric practices labelled Bayesian. However, they appear to also be implementations of
the elementary version of the neoclassical theory presented in the subsection 4.2. For
example, reporting the HPD region of a Bayesian posterior with its mean can be seen
as an implementation of the neoclassical theory s.t. the generic proxy is θ•T,WL, and the
approximation of its distribution is
fˆθ•T (θ) ∝

eTQT (X1:T (ω),θ)w(θ) if θ ∈ Θ \ {θ¯T}
∞ if θ = θ¯T
where θ¯T :=
∫
Θ
θ˙ e
TQT (X1:T (ω),θ˙)w(θ˙)∫
Θ e
TQT (X1:T (ω),θ¨)w(θ¨)λ(θ¨)
λ(dθ˙), and µ = λ. Similarly, reporting marginal
equal-tailed 68% confidence interval of a Bayesian posterior with its mean can be seen
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as an implementation of the neoclassical theory s.t. the generic proxy is θ•T,WL, and the
approximation of its distribution is the product of p Gaussian p.d.f. centered at the
midpoint of the k-th interval with a standard deviation approximately equal to half of
the length of the same interval, i.e.,
fˆθ•T (θ) ∝

∏p
k=1 n(θk;
ak+bk
2
; s¯k,T ) if θ ∈ Θ \ {θ¯T}
∞ if θ = θ¯T
with µ = λ, and where [ak, bk] denotes the reported intervals, s¯k,T ≈ |bk−ak|2 , and n(θ; τ ; s)
is a Gaussian p.d.f. with expectation τ and standard deviation s. 
5.3. Assessment of the Gaussian approximation and a standard-error adjust-
ment. From a neoclassical point of view, the issue raised by multiple use of the same data
boils down to the question of approximation errors. This subsection studies the average
effect of approximations errors, and develops a standard-error adjustment to account for
it. For brevity and relevance, we focus on the Gaussian approximation, which corresponds
to a large part of econometric practice. Assessments of other approximations are left for
future research.
The basic algorithm of our Monte-Carlo simulations is the following.
For m = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,M
(1) Draw i.i.d. data X
(m)
1:T (ω) := (X
(m)
t (ω))
T
t=1
(2) Compute
• θ∗(m)T (ω) = X
(m)
T (ω);
• sˆ
(m)
T (ω)√
T
= 1√
T
√
1
T
∑T
t=1(X
(m)
t (ω)−X(m)T (ω))2;
• Fˆ (m)θ•T (θ) = N
(
θ;X
(m)
T (ω);
sˆ
(m)
T (ω)√
T
)
;
• P
(
θ•T∈Rˆ
(m)
1−α,T (ω)
)
, where Rˆ
(m)
1−α,T :=
[
θ
∗(m)
T −sˆ
(m)
T√
T
u1−α
2
, θ
∗(m)
T −sˆ
(m)
T√
T
uα
2
]
.
We draw data either from a Gaussian distribution, or from a Bernoulli distribution.
Both families of distributions are interesting for different reasons. Data from a Bernoulli
distribution are known to be relatively challenging for Gaussian approximations, especially
when the Bernoulli parameter is close to 0 or 1 (e.g., Agresti and Coull, 1998; Brown ,
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Table 1. Monte-Carlo assessment of Gaussian approximations
for M = 10000. RMSE is the square root of the mean-square
error.a The columns L2 and sup, respectively, correspond to
1
M
∑M
m=1
√∫
Θ
[Fˆ
(m)
θ•T
(θ)− Fθ•T (θ)]2λ(dθ) and 1M
∑M
i=1 supθ∈Θ |Fˆ (m)θ•T (θ) −
Fθ•T (θ)|. R˜1−α,T :=
[
θ∗T−
√
2
T
sˆTu1−α
2
, θ∗T−
√
2
T
sˆTuα
2
]
XT sˆT /
√
T ρ(Fˆθ•T , Fθ
•
T
) P(θ•T∈Rˆ1−α,T (ω)) P(θ•T∈R˜1−α,T (ω))
T P ◦X−11 RMSE RMSE L2 sup .68 .90 .95 .99 .68 .90 .95 .99
20 N (0, .2) .045b .007b .089 .311 .5 .732 .811 .912 .658 .878 .932 .981
50 .028 .003 .07 .303 .51 .746 .825 .924 .671 .892 .943 .987
100 .02 .001 .058 .299 .515 .752 .831 .929 .677 .897 .948 .989
20 N (0, .4) .09 .015 .126 .311 .5 .732 .811 .912 .658 .878 .932 .981
50 .057 .006 .099 .303 .51 .746 .825 .924 .671 .892 .943 .987
100 .04 .003 .082 .299 .515 .752 .831 .929 .677 .897 .948 .989
20 B(2−
√
3
4 )
c .056 .043 .117 .37 .345 .638 .677 .726 .568 .725 .728 .74
50 .035 .027 .083 .405 .48 .74 .794 .885 .632 .87 .89 .937
100 .025 .019 .067 .374 .501 .741 .824 .918 .683 .881 .929 .971
20 B(.5) .113 .053 .143 .375 .566 .729 .838 .911 .686 .88 .931 .981
50 .071 .035 .111 .346 .515 .728 .806 .922 .631d .898 .942 .987
100 .05 .025 .093 .332 .474 .768 .82 .922 .682 .895 .943 .988
a We do no report the bias as we know that XT and
T
T−1 sˆ
2
T are unbiased (e.g., Gourie´roux and Monfort, 1989/1996,
Example 6.4). b RMSE(sˆT /
√
T )=RMSE(sˆT )/
√
T , which elucidates why RMSE(XT ) < RMSE(sˆT /
√
T ). c As in the
Gaussian case, this Bernoulli parameter is chosen to halves the standard deviation of the other Bernoulli, i.e.,√
2−√3
4
(1− 2−
√
3
4
) = .5
2
. d The non-monotonic convergence to .68 is due to the discontinuities induced by the Bernoulli
distribution. See for example Brown, Cai and DasGupta (2002) for a similar phenomenon.
.
Cai and DasGupta, 2002 and references therein). Data from a Gaussian distribution
neutralizes the part of the approximation error coming from the distribution family: the
average of Gaussian random variables is also a Gaussian random variable.
Table 1 shows that, in both cases, Gaussian approximations globally converge in terms
of the first two moments, of the L2 norm, and of the sup norm. However, the probability
of neoclassical confidence regions to contain the generic proxy appears downward biased.
Proposition 1 formalizes this downward bias, and proposes an asymptotic adjustment for
it.
Proposition 1 (Downward bias and standard-error adjustment). Under Assumptions 1,
4, and 6, if ΣˆT
P→ Σ as T →∞, then, for all ET ⊂ σ(X1:T ) and k ∈ [[1, p]],
i) lim
T→∞
E
{
P
(
θ•T,k ∈
[
θ∗T,k −
sˆT,k,k√
T
u1−α
2
, θ∗T,k −
sˆT,k,k√
T
uα
2
]∣∣∣∣ ET)} < 1− α
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Figure 1. Examples of approximation errors for P ◦X−11 d∼ N (0, .4) and
T = 20. The solid black line is P ◦ θ•T−1, while the others are realizations of
its Gaussian approximation N (XT , sˆ
(m)
T√
T
). Vertical dashed lines correspond
to the 95% neoclassical confidence region from P ◦ θ•T−1.
ii) lim
T→∞
E
{
P
(
θ•T,k∈
[
θ∗T,k−
√
2
T
sˆT,k,ku1−α
2
, θ∗T,k−
√
2
T
sˆT,k,kuα
2
]∣∣∣∣∣ ET
)}
= 1− α
where θ∗T,k, sˆ
2
T,k,k and uα/2, respectively, denote the k-th element of the random vector θ
∗
T ,
the k-th diagonal element of the matrix ΣˆT , and the α/2 quantile of a standard univariate
Gaussian N (0, 1).
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Proof. It is an immediate consequence of the asymptotic normality of θ•T,k. For all η > 0,
by iterated conditioning,
lim
T→∞
E
{
P
(
θ•T,k ∈
[
θ∗T,k −
ηsˆT,k,k√
T
u1−α
2
, θ∗T,k −
ηsˆT,k,k√
T
uα
2
]∣∣∣∣ ET)}
= lim
T→∞
P
(
θ•T,k ∈
[
θ∗T,k −
ηsˆT,k,k√
T
u1−α
2
, θ∗T,k −
ηsˆT,k,k√
T
uα
2
])
(a)
= lim
T→∞
P
(
uα
2
6 1
η
√
T
(θ∗T,k − θ•T,k)
sˆT,k,k
6 u1−α
2
)
(b)
= lim
T→∞
P
(
uα
2
6 1
η
√
T
(θ∗T,k − θ0)
sˆT,k,k
+
1
η
√
T
(θ0 − θ•T,k)
sˆT,k,k
6 u1−α
2
)
(c)
= P
(
uα
2
6 N (0,
√
2
η
) 6 u1−α
2
)
=

P
(
uα
2
6 N (0,√2) 6 u1−α
2
)
< 1− α if η = 1, so that it yields i);
P
(
uα
2
6 N (0, 1) 6 u1−α
2
)
= 1− α if η = √2, so that it yields ii).
(a) On one hand, θ•T,k 6 θ∗T,k − ηsˆT,k,k√T uα2 ⇔ uα2 6 1η
√
T
(θ∗T,k−θ•T,k)
sˆT,k,k
. On the other hand,
similarly, θ∗T,k− ηsˆT,k,k√T u1−α2 6 θ•T,k ⇔ 1η
√
T
(θ∗T,k−θ•T,k)
sˆT,k,k
6 u1−α
2
. (b) Add and subtract θ0. (c)
Under Assumption 6, by the continuous mapping theorem (e.g., Kallenberg, 1997/2002,
Lemma 4.3), as T →∞, 1
η
√
T
(θ∗T,k−θ0)
sˆT,k,k
+ 1
η
√
T
(θ0−θ•T,k)
sˆT,k,k
P→ ξ∗k
ηsk,k
+
ξ•k
ηsk,k
, where ξ∗k
d∼ N (0, sk,k)
is independent from ξ•k. 
Proposition 1i) shows that the downward bias holds under general assumptions, inde-
pendently of the sub-sigma algebra of the data we condition on. Figure 1 (p. 34) illustrates
the reason of this downward bias : the Gaussian approximation does not account for the
fact that its mean and standard deviation are not known, but estimated, so that there
is an approximation error. Proposition 1ii) shows that multiplying the standard error by
√
2 asymptotically accounts for the average approximation error, independently of the
sub-sigma algebra of the data we condition on. The RHS columns of Table 1 suggest that
this asymptotic adjustment is effective in finite sample. The proof of Proposition 1 for-
malizes the rationale behind the adjustment: asymptotically, after centering and scaling
by
√
T , the average approximation error exactly corresponds to the uncertainty about θ•T ,
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Figure 2. Relation between nominal level and adjusted nominal level of a test.
so that the variance is doubled by independence, which means that the standard error is
multiplied by
√
2.
As can be seen from Figure 2 (p. 36), the adjustment has a nonlinear effect on confidence
region and test levels. The adjustment has a stronger effect in the tails because Gaussian
distributions are exponentially decreasing in the tails. Tables 2, 3 and 4 are conversion
tables that documents the effect of the adjustment at conventional levels. They should
be of special interest to applied econometricians. Table 2 shows that tests at nominal
levels .01, .05 and .1 are tests at approximate adjusted nominal levels .069, .166 and .245,
respectively. Conversely, Table 3 shows that tests at adjusted nominal level .01, .05, and
.1 respectively requires the non-adjusted p-values computed by standard software to be
approximately below .027(10−2), .056(10−1), and .020 for rejection of the test hypothesis.
Table 4 shows the effect of the adjustment on critical values for the non-adjusted t-values
computed by standard software. Tables 2, 3 and 4 shed a new light on results published
in nonexperimental fields. In particular, in view of the data collected by Brodeur, Le´,
Sangnier and Zylberberg (2013, Figure I), the adjustment appears to affect the significance
at conventional levels of many results in the economic literature.
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Table 2. From nominal levels to adjusted nominal levels.
Nominal Level .01 .05 .1 .32
Adj. nominal level (appr.) .069 .166 .245 .482
Adj. and appr. respectively stand for adjusted and approximation.
Table 3. From adjusted nominal levels to nominal levels, and adjusted
critical values for non-adjusted t-statistics.
Adj. nominal level .01 .05 .1 .32
Nominal Level (appr.) .027(10−2) .056(10−1) .020 .16
Adj. and appr. respectively stand for adjusted and approximation.
Table 4. From non-adjusted critical values to adjusted critical values for
non-adjusted t-statistics.
Non-adjusted critical values 2.58 1.96 1.64 .99
Adj. critical values (appr.) 3.64 2.77 2.33 1.41
Adj. and appr. respectively stand for adjusted and approximation.
6. Conclusion
In nonexperimental fields, it is inescapable to compute test statistics and confidence
regions that are not probabilistically independent from previously examined data. It
has been known for decades that Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian inference theories are
inadequate for such a practice. This paper recalls these inadequacies, and formally shows
that they also hold m.a.e. A novel inadequacy of the Neyman-Pearson theory for past-
realized data is also established. Then, a general inference theory compatible with multiple
use of the same data m.a.e. is outlined. We call it the neoclassical inference theory.
The starting point of the neoclassical theory is the acknowledgement that econometric
inference relies on the use of a sample counterpart of the unknown parameter θ0 as a
proxy for the latter one. Then, the idea is to base inference on an approximation of
the unconditional distribution of the proxy. By definition, the unconditional distribution
of the proxy is about all the possible values of the proxy induced by all the possible
samples that could have been observed. Thus, neoclassical inference does not depend on
the realized data m.a.e. Therefore, if we set aside approximation errors, the neoclassical
theory explains why econometric inference can rely on multiple use of the same data.
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The other side of the coin is that, from a neoclassical point of view, the issue raised by
multiple use of the same data boils down to the question of the approximation errors, which
is the topic of most of the econometric and statistical literature. Nevertheless, Monte-
Carlo simulations show that finding accurate approximations is not sufficient. Even when
the approximation method is known to be accurate, errors can have a consequential effect
on tests and confidence regions. In particular, we prove that the Gaussian approximation
yields a downward bias in the probability of neoclassical confidence regions to contain
the generic proxy. Thus, we derive a general, but simple asymptotic standard-error ad-
justment to remove this bias. Monte-Carlo simulations suggest that the adjustment is
effective in finite sample. However, more work would be needed to study the impact
of approximation errors in other situations. The authors have work in progress in that
direction.
Beyond the question of multiple use of the same data, the neoclassical inference the-
ory is promising. The neoclassical inference theory sheds a new light on foundational
and methodological debates in statistics, economics and finance (e.g., calibration vs. es-
timation, and Bayesian inference vs. classical inference). The Example and section 5
show that the neoclassical theory provides a unifying framework for model calibration
and several common econometric practices, whether they are labelled Bayesian or a` la
Neyman-Pearson. Moreover, work in progress by the authors indicates that the version
of the neoclassical developed in this paper is generalizable.
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Appendix A. Consistency adequacy
The following proposition shows that multiple use of the same data does not affect the
consistency of a point estimator. In this Appendix A, m.a.e. means that we always con-
sider the asymptotic limit to be exact for any sample size T . Nevertheless, for simplicity,
we also exclude the case a` la Hoffmann-Jørgensen (see Wellner and van der Vaart, 1996)
in which finite-sample statistics do not need to be measurable.
Proposition 2 (Consistency adequacy). Let θˆT be an estimator of θ0, i.e., a measurable
mapping from (Ω, EΩ) to (Θ, EΘ), where EΘ denotes a σ-algebra on Θ. Under Assumption
1,
i) if θˆT is strongly consistent, then, for all S ∈ ST , {X1:T ∈ S} and {θˆT = θ0} are
independent m.a.e., i.e.,
P
(
{θˆT = θ0} ∩ {X1:T ∈ S}
)
= P(θˆT = θ0)P(X1:T ∈ S)m.a.e.;
ii) if θˆT is weakly consistent, then, for all S ∈ ST , and for all neighborhood Nθ0 of
θ0, {X1:T ∈ S} and {θˆT ∈ Nθ0} are independent m.a.e., i.e.,
P
(
{θˆT ∈ Nθ0} ∩ {X1:T ∈ S}
)
= P(θˆT ∈ Nθ0)P(X1:T ∈ S)m.a.e.
Proof. It is definition chasing. By a standard property of probability, for all A,B ∈ EΩ,
P(A ∪ B) = P(A) + P(B) − P(A ∩ B). Thus, if P(A) = 1, adding P(A ∩ B) − 1 on both
sides yields
P(A ∩B) = P(B) = P(A)P(B) (10)
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because 1 = P(A) 6 P(A ∪B) 6 1.
i) By definition of strong consistency, P(limT→∞ θˆT = θ0) = 1, which means that
P(θˆT = θ0) = 1 m.a.e. Then, apply (10) with A = {θˆT = θ0} and B = {X1:T ∈ S}.
ii) By definition of weak consistency, for all neighborhood Nθ0 of θ0, limT→∞ P∗(θˆT ∈
Nθ0) = 1, which means that P(θˆT ∈ Nθ0) = 1 m.a.e. Then, apply (10) with A = {θˆT ∈
Nθ0} and B = {X1:T ∈ S}. 
Remark 18. Inspection of the proof shows that consistency is independent of any event,
i.e., we can replace {X1:T ∈ S} by any event E ∈ EΩ in the proof, and thus in the
statement of Proposition 2. 
Appendix B. Details of the proof of Theorem 1
In this appendix, we provide a detailed proof of Theorem 1, i.e., we provide details
regarding the qualification “m.a.e.” We only consider the case a` la Hoffmann-Jørgensen,
as the standard asymptotic case follows easily from it.
Proof. i) {X1:T ∈ AT} and {θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (X1:T )} are not independent m.a.e. if, and only
if,
lim inf
T→∞
P∗({θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (XT )} ∩ {X1:T ∈ AT}) 6= lim inf
T→∞
P∗(θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (XT )P(X1:T ∈ AT )
(a)⇔ lim inf
T→∞
P∗({θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (XT )} ∩ {X1:T ∈ AT})
P(X1:T ∈ AT ) 6= lim infT→∞ P∗(θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (XT ))
(b)⇔ lim inf
T→∞
P∗(θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (XT )|X1:T ∈ AT ) 6= lim inf
T→∞
P∗(θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (XT ))
⇔ P(θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (X1:T )|X1:T ∈ AT ) 6= P(θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (X1:T )) m.a.e.
(a) By assumption, P(X1:T ∈ AT ) = c > 0. (b) P∗({θ0∈C1−α,T (XT )}∩{X1:T∈AT })P(X1:T∈AT ) = 1P(X1:T∈AT ) sup{P(E) :
E ⊂ ({θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (XT )} ∩ {X1:T ∈ AT}) ∧ E ∈ E} = sup{ P(E)P(X1:T∈AT ) : E ⊂ ({θ0 ∈
C1−α,T (XT )}∩{X1:T ∈ AT})∧ E ∈ E} = sup{P(E∩{X1:T∈AT })P(X1:T∈AT ) : E ⊂ ({θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (XT )}∩
{X1:T ∈ AT}) ∧ E ∈ E(X1:T ∈ AT )} = sup{P(E|X1:T ∈ S) : E ⊂ ({θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (XT )} ∩
{X1:T ∈ AT}) ∧ E ∈ E(X1:T ∈ AT )} = P∗(θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (XT )|X1:T ∈ AT ), where for all
A ∈ E , E(A) := {B ∩ A : B ∈ E}.
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ii) Replace in the proof of (i), {θ0 ∈ C1−α,T (XT )}, inf, and P∗ by {dT (XT ) = dA}, sup,
and P∗, respectively. 
Remark 19. In the above proof, the assumption P(X1:T ∈ AT ) = c > 0 can be weakened
to limT→∞ P(X1:T ∈ AT ) = c > 0. However, the non-existence of the limit or the non-
measurability of the conditioning event {X1:T ∈ AT} would make the proof more difficult.
In particular, in the latter case, we would need a conditional version of nonadditive outer
and inner measures, and there does not seem to be a consensus on this subject (e.g.,
Young and Wang, 1998). These difficulties do not affect the main conclusion of section 2
as they are the counterpart of the difficulties to establish the Neyman-Pearson validity of
a confidence region or a test. 
Appendix C. Neyman-Pearson inadequacy for past-realized data
As pointed out in Remark 4 on p. 8, Theorem 1 can be viewed as a formalization of
the Neyman-Pearson inadequacy for past-realized data when only part of the data have
been realized before the determination of the confidence regions and tests. This appendix
formalizes this inadequacy in the case in which all data at use have been previously
realized. For simplicity, we rule out the case a` la Hoffmann-Jørgensen in which finite-
sample statistics do not need to be measurable. We also require the following assumption
for the determination of the confidence intervals.
Assumption 8. Let P be the probability measure on (Ω, E) s.t. P ◦ X−11:T is the uncon-
ditional physical and unknown distribution of X1:T . (a)There exists a mapping G from
the space of all probability measures on (Ω, E) to the parameter space Θ s.t. G(P) := θ0.
(b) There exists a family of probability measures (Pθ)θ∈Θ on (Ω, EΩ) s.t., for all θ ∈ Θ,
θ = G(Pθ), and P is dominated by Pθ, i.e., P Pθ.
Assumption 8 is often satisfied. Assumption 8(a) requires the parameter θ0 to depend on
the underlying probability measure that defines the distribution of the data X1:T . Without
this assumption, it seems difficult to see how θ0 can be inferred from the data X1:T .
Assumption 8(b) first requires Assumption 8(a) to hold independently of the location of
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θ0 in Θ. It corresponds to the idea that the parameter space Θ is the set of possible
values for θ0. Second, Assumption 8(b) requires all the measures in the family (Pθ)θ∈Θ
to dominate the unknown probability measure P. This can be restrictive. Nevertheless,
Assumption 8(b) is often satisfied, and it is weaker than some assumptions in the literature
on maximum-likelihood (e.g., Lehmann and Casella, 1983/1998, sec. 6.3; Gourie´roux and
Monfort, 1989/1996, sec. 7.D.) or empirical processes (e.g., Khmaladze, 1981). These
references require, for all (θ, θ˙) ∈ Θ2, the existence of a unique pair of probability measures
(Pθ,Pθ˙) s.t. θ = G(Pθ), θ˙ = G(Pθ˙), and Pθ is equivalent to Pθ˙, i.e., Pθ ∼ Pθ˙. We require
Assumption 8(b) to ensure that, for all θ ∈ Θ, Pθ-null sets are also P-null sets.
Under Assumption 8, the following Proposition 3 formalizes the Neyman-Pearson in-
adequacy that arises when all data at use have been previously realized.
Proposition 3 (Neyman-Pearson inadequacy for past-realized data). i) Let α ∈ [0, 1[,
and C1−α,T (X1:T ) be a 1 − α pivotal Neyman-Pearson confidence region under
(Pθ(.|X1:T ))θ∈Θ, i.e., (i) for all ω ∈ Ω, C1−α,T (X1:T (ω)) ⊂ Θ, (ii) for all θ ∈
Θ, {x1:T ∈ ST : θ ∈ C1−α,T (x1:T )} ∈ ST , and (iii) for all θ ∈ Θ, Pθ(θ ∈
C1−α,T (X1:T )|X1:T ) > 1−α m.a.e. Under Assumptions 1 and 8, C1−α,T (X1:T ) = Θ
P-a.s. m.a.e.
ii) Let dT be a Neyman-Pearson test of level α ∈ [0, 1[ under P(.|X1:T ), i.e., P(dT (X1:T ) =
dA|X1:T ) 6 α m.a.e., if H is true. Under Assumption 1, if H is true, dT (X1:T ) = dH
P-a.s. m.a.e., which implies that there does not exist a Neyman-Pearson test of
level α ∈ [0, 1[ under P(.|X1:T ) s.t. the probability of type I error is nonnegative
m.a.e.
Proof. i) By definition of conditional probabilities, for all θ ∈ Θ, Pθ-a.s.,
Pθ(θ ∈ C1−α,T (X1:T )|X1:T ) = Eθ[lC1−α,T (X1:T )(θ)|X1:T ]
= lC1−α,T (X1:T )(θ)
=

1 if θ ∈ C1−α,T (X1:T )
0 otherwise
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where the second equality comes from the upcoming Lemma 3i). Then, Pθ(θ ∈ C1−α,T (X1:T )|X1:T ) >
1− α m.a.e., for all θ ∈ Θ, if, and only if, θ ∈ C1−α,T (X1:T ) Pθ-a.s. m.a.e. for all θ ∈ Θ.
Now, by Assumption 8(b), for all θ ∈ Θ, P Pθ. Thus, C1−α,T (X1:T ) = Θ P-a.s. m.a.e.
ii) By definition of conditional probabilities, P-a.s.,
P(dT (X1:T ) = dA|X1:T ) = E[l{dT (X1:T )=dA}|X1:T ]
= l{dT (X1:T )=dA}
=

1 if dT (X1:T ) = dA
0 if dT (X1:T ) = dH
where the second equality comes from the upcoming Lemma 3ii). Now, P(dT (X1:T ) =
dA|X1:T ) 6 α m.a.e., if, and only if, dT (X1:T ) = dH P-a.s. m.a.e. Thus, the result
follows. 
Proposition 3ii) shows that, when all data at use have been previously realized, only
Neyman-Pearson tests with zero probability type I error m.a.e. are possible. Although
it is possible to design such tests, most available tests have a nonnegative probability of
type I error m.a.e. In addition, the Neyman-Pearson approach to testing is to minimize
the probability of type II error rather than the probability of type I error (Neyman and
Pearson, 1933).
Proposition 3i) shows that, when all data at use have been previously realized, the
only possible Neyman-Pearson confidence region is the whole parameter space Θ P-a.s.
m.a.e. Such a confidence region is uninformative. The assumptions of Proposition 3i)
that are new w.r.t. Assumptions 1 and 8 are mild. When the unknown parameter θ0
can be any value inside the parameter space Θ, it seems difficult to see how a confidence
region cannot be pivotal. Thus, Assumption 1 and 8 are often part of the definition of
confidence regions. E.g., Ferguson, 1967, sec. 5.8; Gourie´roux and Monfort, 1989/1996,
sec. 20.
The combination of Theorem 1 and Proposition 3 suggests that Neyman-Pearson theory
is inadequate for past-realized data. This inadequacy is stronger than the inadequacy for
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multiple use of the same data, because used data are necessarily a subset of the realized
data. Moreover, conditioning on the past realization instead of on the knowledge is more
in line with Neyman-Pearson theory for at least two reasons. First, unlike conditioning on
knowledge, conditioning on past realizations is not individual-specific, which is a feature
often presented as an advantage of the Neyman-Pearson theory over Bayesian theory. Sec-
ond, unlike Bayesian theory, the Neyman-Pearson theory distinguishes between unknown
and random quantities, so that it is difficult to understand why past-realized data, which
are now fixed, should be regarded as random.
Remark 20. If randomized test decision rules are allowed, Proposition 3(ii) is weaker. In
this case, if, instead of a level of the test, the probability of type I error is fixed, it can be
shown that randomized test decision rules dT and the data XT are independent under H.
In this paper, we do not consider randomized test decision rules in details for brevity and
relevance: they are rarely used in econometrics. Moreover, Theorem 1 remains mainly
unchanged for randomized test decision rules.

Remark 21. While the Neyman-Pearson inadequacy for multiple use of the same data has
been mentioned in the literature, the inadequacy for past-realized data is novel to the
best of our knowledge. 
Lemma 3. i) Under the notations and assumptions of Proposition 3(i), for all θ˙ ∈
Θ, the indicator function lC1−α,T (X1:T (.))(θ˙) : Ω → {0, 1} is σ(X1:T )/P({0, 1})-
measurable.
ii) Under the notations and assumptions of Proposition 3(ii), the indicator function
l{dT (X1:T (.))=dA} : Ω→ {0, 1} is σ(X1:T )/P({0, 1})-measurable.
Proof. i) Let θ˙ ∈ Θ. For this proof, define the functions f : ST → {0, 1} and h :
Ω → {0, 1} s.t. f(.) := lC1−α,T (.)(θ˙) and h(.) := lC1−α,T (X1:T (.))(θ˙). Then, h−1(1) =
(f ◦X1:T )−1(1) = X−11:T [f−1(1)] = X−11:T ({x1:T ∈ ST : θ˙ ∈ C1−α,T (x1:T )}) ∈ σ(X1:T ), where
the last equality follows the defining property (ii) of confidence regions (see Definition 1
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on p. 1) and Assumption 1(c). Now, σ({1}) = P({0, 1}), and inverse mapping preserves
the set operations that generates σ-algebra (e.g., Kallenberg, 1997/2002, p. 3, eq. (1)).
Thus, the result follows.
ii) Follow the same reasoning as for (i) with f(.) := l{dT (.)=dA} and h(.) := l{dT (X1:T (.))=dA}.

Appendix D. Existence of neoclassical confidence regions
In this Appendix, we prove the existence of neoclassical confidence regions under mild
assumptions. We adapt a proof from Holcblat (2012). For notational convenience, we
omit the qualification m.a.e., although all equalities should be understood m.a.e.
Proposition 4 (Existence of neoclassical confidence regions). Under Assumptions 1, 4,
and 5, for all α ∈ [0, 1], there exists a neoclassical confidence region, R1−α,T .
Proof. Define, for all α ∈ [0, 1],
k˙ := sup
k∈R
{
k : P ◦ θ•T−1
({
θ ∈ Θ : fθ•T (θ) > k
})
> 1− α}
On the one hand, under Assumptions 1, 4, and 5, P ◦ θ•T−1
({
θ ∈ Θ : fθ•T (θ) > 0
})
= 1.
On the other hand, under Assumptions 1, 4, and 5, by the upcoming Lemma 4, for all
α ∈ [0, 1], there exists k¨ ∈ R+∪{∞} s.t. k > k¨ implies P◦θ•T−1
({
θ ∈ Θ : fθ•T (θ) > k
})
6
1−α. Thus, there exists an increasing sequence (kn)n>1 with to kn ↑ k˙ such that ∀n > 1,
P ◦ θ•T−1
({
θ : fθ•T (θ) > kn
})
> 1− α. Then, by Lemma 4i),
P ◦ θ•T−1
({
θ ∈ Θ : fθ•T (θ) > k˙
})
= lim
n→∞
P ◦ θ•T−1
({
θ ∈ Θ : fθ•T (θ) > kn
})
> 1− α.
Now, under Assumption 5,
{
θ ∈ Θ : fθ•T (θ) > k˙
}
∈ EΘ, so that, by construction, it is a
neoclassical confidence region. 
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions 1, 4, and 5,
i) ∀k > 0, k 7→ P ◦ θ•T−1
({
θ ∈ Θ : fθ•T (θ) > k
})
is a left-continuous decreasing func-
tion;
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ii) for all α ∈ [0, 1], there exists k¨ ∈ R+∪{∞} s.t. P◦θ•T−1
({
θ ∈ Θ : fθ•T (θ) > k¨
})
<
1− α.
Proof. i) Under Assumption 5, P◦θ•T−1 is probability measure, so that k 7→ P◦θ•T−1
({
θ ∈ Θ : fθ•T (θ) > k
})
is decreasing by monotonicity of measures. Prove left-continuity. Let (kn)n>1 s.t. kn ↑
k ∈ R+ ∪ {∞}. Then,
P ◦ θ•T−1
({
θ ∈ Θ : fθ•T (θ) > k
})
= P ◦ θ•T−1
(⋂
n>1
{
θ ∈ Θ : fθ•T (θ) > kn
})
= lim
n→∞
P ◦ θ•T−1
({
θ ∈ Θ : fθ•T (θ) > kn
})
where the last equality follows from a standard continuity property of measures under
Assumption 5 (e.g. in Kallenberg, 1997/2002, p. 8, Lemma 1.14).
ii) For all real number k > 0,
k
∫
Θ
l{θ˙∈Θ:fθ•
T
(θ˙)>k}(θ)µ(dθ) 6
∫
Θ
fθ•T (θ)µ(dθ)
(a)⇒ lim
k→∞
∫
Θ
l{θ˙∈Θ:fθ•
T
(θ˙)>k}(θ)µ(dθ) 6 lim
k→∞
1
k
= 0
(b)⇒
∫
Θ
lim
k→∞
l{θ˙∈Θ:fθ•
T
(θ˙)>k}(θ)µ(dθ) = lim
k→∞
∫
Θ
l{θ˙∈Θ:fθ•
T
(θ˙)>k}(θ)µ(dθ) = 0
(c)⇒ lim
k→∞
fθ•T (θ)l{θ˙∈Θ:fθ•
T
(θ˙)>k}(θ) = 0 µ-a.e.
(d)⇒ lim
k→∞
∫
Θ
fθ•T (θ)l{θ˙∈Θ:fθ•
T
(θ˙)>k}(θ)µ(dθ) =
∫
Θ
lim
k→∞
fθ•T (θ)l{θ˙∈Θ:fθ•
T
(θ˙)>k}(θ)µ(dθ) = 0
(a) By Assumption 5,
∫
Θ
fθ•T (θ)µ(dθ) = P ◦ θ•T−1(Θ) = 1. (b) Under Assumption 5, for
all k > 1, l{θ∈Θ:fθ•
T
(θ)>k} 6 kl{θ∈Θ:fθ•
T
(θ)>k} 6 fθ•T (θ) where
∫
Θ
|fθ•T (θ)|µ(dθ) < ∞. Thus
apply Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem. (c) First, by definition of Lebesgue’s
integral, limk→∞ l{θ˙∈Θ:fθ•
T
(θ˙)>k}(θ) = 0 µ-a.e. (e.g., in Kallenberg, 1997/2002, p. 13,
Lemma 1.24). Second, Assumption 5 implies that fθ•T (θ) is finite µ-a.e.: if there existed
B ∈ EΘ s.t. µ(B) > 0 and fθ•T = ∞ on B, then, by definition of Lebesgue’s integral,
∞ = ∫
B
fθ•T (θ)µ(dθ) 6
∫
Θ
fθ•T (θ)µ(dθ) = P ◦ θ•T−1(Θ) = 1. (d) Under Assumption 5, for
all k ∈ R, |fθ•T (θ)l{θ˙∈Θ:fθ•
T
(θ˙)>k}(θ)| 6 fθ•T (θ) where
∫
Θ
|fθ•T (θ)|µ(dθ) < ∞. Thus apply
Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem.
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Therefore, for all α ∈ [0, 1], there exists k¨ ∈ R+∪{∞} s.t. P◦θ•T−1
({
θ ∈ Θ : fθ•T (θ) > k¨
})
=∫
Θ
fθ•T (θ)l{θ˙∈Θ:fθ•
T
(θ˙)>k¨}(θ)µ(dθ) 6 1− α. 
Appendix E. Analyses of the approximation error in the Example and
some variants of it
The central object of study in assessing an applied neoclassical method is the distri-
bution of ̂P ◦ θ•T−1. This problem can conceptually be dealt with in the same way as in
the classical case. We here include some illustrations for deriving aspects of the law of
̂P ◦ θ•T−1 with respect to the probability measure of the data generating process. General-
izing this investigation parallels the development of classical statistical inference theory.
We here mean merely to point out that such an investigation is a matter of mathemati-
cal development and sophistication, and is not a conceptual problem for the neoclassical
framework.
In subsection E.1 we study the distribution of the cumulative distribution function
and density of ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 where we restrict attention to the example with i.i.d N (θ0, s)
observations. In subsection E.2 we study the concentration of ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 around P ◦ θ•T−1
when N (X¯T , s) is used to approximate the distribution of θ0 = E(X1) when X1:T are
i.i.d. observations not necessarily from a Gaussian distribution. In the Gaussian case, we
deduce the exact finite-sample distribution of the distance between ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 and P ◦ θ•T−1
for the Hellinger and Wasserstein distances.
E.1. The exact distribution of ̂P ◦ θ•T−1. Let Fˆθ•T (x, ω) be the cumulative distribution
function induced by ̂P ◦ θ•T−1. Consider the basic example with i.i.d. N (θ0, s) observa-
tions, so that Fˆθ•T (x, ω) = N(
x−X¯T (ω)
sT (ω)/
√
T
; 0; 1). Let us identify the distribution of Fˆθ•T (x),
first when x is fixed, and, for the simpler case when s is assumed known also deal with
x 7→ Fˆθ•T (x) as a stochastic process.
For a given x, we have that the distribution of the random variable Fˆθ•T (x, ω) is
known exactly when the observations are i.i.d. N (θ0, s), since clearly Hx(y) := P(ω ∈
Ω : Fˆθ•T (x, ω) 6 y) = P(ω ∈ Ω : N([x − X¯T (ω)]/[sT (ω)/
√
T ]; 0; 1) 6 y) = P([x −
X¯T ]/[sT/
√
T ] 6 N−1(y; 0; 1)) where N−1(y; 0; 1) is the inverse function of N(x; 0; 1),
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i.e. the standard Normal quantile function. It is well known that W := (T − 1)s2T/s2 d∼
χ2T−1 is such that (X¯T ,W ) are independent. Hence Z := (x− X¯)/(s/
√
T )
d∼ N (−x/s, 1)
and W are also independent. We hence see that Hx is the cumulative distribution function
of a quotient of two independent random variables with a known distribution, and that
Hx is therefore easy to obtain. Clearly, Hx only depends on T and the ratio x/s. If s is
assumed known, the distribution is known exactly. In the case of s known, we also note
that Fˆθ•T (x) = N(G(x); 0; 1) where G is the continuous Gaussian process G(x) =
√
T (x−
θ0)/s + ε where ε
d∼ N (0, 1) and that fˆθ•T (x) = (d/dx)Fˆθ•T (x) equals
√
Tn(G(x); 0; 1)/s.
Finally, arg maxx fˆθ•T (x) = arg maxx
√
Tn(G(x); 0; 1)/s = arg maxx n(G(x); 0; 1) is the so-
lution to G(x) = 0, i.e. we regain the observation that arg maxx fˆθ•T (x) = θ0− (s/
√
T )ε
d∼
N (θ0, s/
√
T ).
E.2. A probability bound for ρ( ̂P ◦ θ•T−1,P ◦ θ•T−1). A feature of ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 which is of
special interest is its concentration around P ◦ θ•T−1. Consider % = ρ( ̂P ◦ θ•T−1,P ◦ θ•T−1)
based on some metric ρ on the space of all probability measures on (Θ, EΘ). As ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 is
data-dependent, clearly % is a random mapping. Studying the law of % directly is generally
complicated. This problem is however, connected to several well-studied problems in
classical statistics and probability. We here illustrate some basic issues relating to the
study of %.
Let P ◦ θ•T,∞−1 be a distribution that is known to approximate P◦θ•∞−1 on some appro-
priate scale. As in the proof of Lemma 2, we use the triangle inequality to see that
% 6 ρ( ̂P ◦ θ•T−1,P ◦ θ•T,∞−1) + ρ(P ◦ θ•T,∞−1,P ◦ θ•T−1). (11)
If P ◦ θ•T,∞−1 is well-chosen, this bound can be used to derive bounds for the exceedance
probabilities of %. We note that this triangle inequality bound is general, but is likely to
be crude compared to other bounds where more of the structure of the problem is used.
In the case when
√
T (θ•T − θ0) L−−−→
T→∞
N (0,Σ 12 ) for some covariance matrix Σ, the
natural choice of P ◦ θ•T,∞−1 is the distribution N (θ0,Σ
1
2/
√
T ). In this case, we typically
have that ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 has the data-dependent distribution N (θ∗0(ω), Σˆ
1
2 (ω)/
√
T ), and we see
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that the first term in the above display quantifies the loss in precision in not knowing the
population parameters that are in the Normal approximation of the law of θ•T .
The first term in the bound of eq. (11) compares the distance between two exactly
Normal distributions, one of which is data-dependent. This is the only stochastic term in
eq. (11) and bounds, or even exact expressions for comparing the law of two Normals are
available for several probability metrics as we will illustrate shortly.
The second term in the bound of eq. (11) quantifies how good this Normal approxi-
mation is to the distribution of θ•T if these parameters are known, and is a well-studied
problem, especially for the Kolmogorov metric where the celebrated Berry-Esseen Theo-
rem applies.
E.2.1. The i.i.d. Gaussian case. In our example with i.i.d. N (θ0, s) observations, both
the distribution of X¯•T and the approximation N (X¯T (ω), sT (X1:T (ω))√T ) are Gaussian and we
can work directly with % = ρ(N (X¯T , sT/
√
T ),N (θ0, s/
√
T )).
When ρ is the Hellinger or total variation distance, we will see that % does not converge
to zero, but does converge to zero with the Wasserstein distance. The Wasserstein distance
is a finer metric than the Prohorov and the Le´vy metric. If at least one of the probability
distributions that are compared have a density with respect to Lebesgue measure with
finite supremum – which is the case when comparing two Gaussians – the Le´vy metric
is in turn equivalent to the Kolmogorov metric (Gibbs and Su, 2002). On the ladder
of probability metrics, the fact that % is oP (1) when ρ is the Wasserstein metric but
not when ρ is the Hellinger metric gives information on how fine-grained the neoclassical
approximation is in an elementary case.
Let ρ be the Hellinger distance, i.e., the metric on the space of probability measures with
densities with respect to Lebesgue measure given by ρH(ν1, ν2) =
[∫
R(
√
f1 −
√
f2)
2 dλ
]1/2
where f1, f2 are the densities with respect to Lebesgue measure of ν1, ν2 respectively
(Gibbs and Su, 2002). Letting f1, f2 be the densities of N (X¯T , sT/
√
T ) and N (θ0, s/
√
T )
respectively, we see that 1− %2/2 = ∫R√f1f2 dλ = √2(sT /√T )(s/√T )s2T /T+s2/T exp{−14 (X¯T−θ0)2s2T /T+s2/T} =√
2sT s
s2T+s
2 exp
{
−T
4
(X¯T−θ0)2
s2T+s
2
}
, which shows that % =
√
2
(
1−
√
2sT s
s2T+s
2 exp
{
− s2
4
Z2T
s2T+s
2
})1/2
where ZT :=
√
T (X¯T − θ0)/s d∼ N (0, 1). If s is assumed known, we can replace sT with s
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in the above expression and get % =
√
2
√
1− e−χ21/8, which has a distribution that does
not change with T . In both cases, % does not converge to zero, but is a non-degenerate
random variable. The same conclusion holds for the total variation metric, since it is
equivalent to the Hellinger metric (Gibbs and Su, 2002).
Let ρ be the Wasserstein distance, i.e., the metric on the space of probability measures
given by ρW (ν1, ν2) =
∫
R |F1(x) − F2(x)|dx where F1, F2 are the cumulative distribution
functions ν1, ν2 respectively (Gibbs and Su, 2002). Letting F1, F2 be the cumulative dis-
tribution functions of N (X¯T , sT/
√
T ) and N (θ0, s/
√
T ) respectively, (Givens and Shortt,
1984, equation (4)) shows
% = ρW (F1, F2) =
√
|X¯T − θ0|2 + s2T/T + s2/T − 2ssT/T ) (12)
which clearly goes to zero in probability. When s is assumed known, we see that % =
|X¯T − θ0| = s|N (0, 1)|/
√
T , which follows a folded Normal distribution, so that E% =
T−1/2
√
2/pi. In both cases, % = OP (T
−1/2).
E.2.2. The general i.i.d. case. Let us now work with the case with i.i.d. observations X1:T
from a distribution with finite third order moment ζ, variance s2 and expectation θ0, but
not necessarily being absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. We use
X¯T as a proxy for θ0 and, motivated by the Central Limit Theorem, approximate P◦θ•T−1
with N (X¯T (ω), sT (ω)/
√
T ). Because P ◦ θ•T−1 is not Normal, we resort to the bound in
eq. (11). For the second term in the bound, we will use the Berry-Esseen bound, which is
given in terms of the Kolmogorov distance ρK(ν1, ν2) = supx |F1(x)−F2(x)| where F1, F2
being the c.d.f. induced by ν1, ν2 respectively.
From eq. (11), we see ρK(N (X¯T , sT/
√
T ),P◦θ•T−1) 6 %1+%2 where %1 := ρK(N (X¯T , sT/
√
T ),N (θ0, s/
√
T ))
and %2 := ρK(N (θ0, s/
√
T ),P ◦ θ•T−1). The first term compares two Gaussians. Calcula-
tions show that %1 = |N(Q; 0; 1) − N(stQ/s + ZT ; 0; 1) for ZT =
√
T (X¯T − θ0)/s where
ZT =
√
T (X¯T − θ0)/s d∼ N (0, 1) and Q = (sTZ/s−
√
Z2T + 2(s
2/s2T − 1) log(s/sT ))/(1−
s2/s2T ). We hence have an exact expression for %1, and we see it is oP (1). We have
ρK(N (θ0, s/
√
T ),P◦θ•T−1) = supx∈R |N(
√
T (x−θ0)/s; 0; 1)−P(X¯n 6 x)| = supx∈R |N(
√
T (x−
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θ0)/s; 0; 1) − P(Zn 6
√
T (x − θ0)/s))| = supz∈R |N(
√
Tz; 0; 1) − P(ZT 6
√
Tz)| =
supz∈R |N(z; 0; 1) − P(ZT 6 z)| which is bounded by Cζs−3/
√
T by the Berry-Esseen
bound for a (2pi)−1/2 < C < 0.4748 (Shevtsova, 2011).
Appendix F. Consistency of approximations
In this appendix, we investigate the consistency of the approximations presented in
subsection 5.2. As in the main text of this paper, we use the Prokhorov metric, and
the Lemma 2 (p. 24). The following Lemma 5 ensures that the condition (b) of Lemma
2 is satisfied, so that it only remains to check the condition (a) of Lemma 2 for each
approximation.
Lemma 5. Let ρP (., .) be the Prokhorov metric. Under Assumptions 1 and 4, if θ
•
T
P→ θ0
as T →∞, then ρP (P ◦ θ•T−1, δθ0)→ 0 as T →∞.
Proof. Convergence in probability implies convergence in law (e.g., Kallenberg, 1997/2002,
Lemma 4.7), which, in turn, is equivalent to the convergence w.r.t. ρP . 
F.1. Consistency of calibration. In this subsection, we study the asymptotic proper-
ties of calibration from a neoclassical point of view under the assumption that calibration
yields consistent parameter values. This assumption should hold if the calibrated param-
eter value corresponds to estimates from existing empirical studies, or to the minimizer
of some goodness-of-fit measure (e.g., Gourie´roux and Monfort, 1996, sec. 2.1.2.). For
criterium-adjusted calibration, we require the following properties from the criterium
function.
Assumption 9. (a) The criterion function u : Rp × Rp → R+ equals zero out-
side Θ2, and θ 7→ u(θ, θ˙) is Borel measurable for all θ˙ ∈ Θ. (b) For all θ˙ ∈ Θ,
θ 7→ u(θ˙, θ) is continuous in a neighborhood of θ0. (c) There exists r1 > 0 s.t.∫
Θ
supθ˙∈Br1 (θ0) u(θ, θ˙)λ(dθ) < ∞, where Br1(θ0) denotes a ball in Θ centered at θ0 with
radius r1. (d) There exists r2 > 0 s.t., for all θ˙ ∈ Br2(θ0), 0 <
∫
Θ
u(θ, θ˙)λ(dθ).
Assumption 9(a) requires the criterion function to be positive and to take zero values
outside Θ2. As explained in Remark 16 on p. 31, Assumption 9(a) (combined with
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Assumption 9(d)) allows us to transform criterion functions into a p.d.f., so that we remain
within the elementary framework of section 4.2. Assumption 9(b) requires continuity
of criterion function, which is a standard and relatively mild requirement: continuous
functions are dense in the set of Borel measurable functions (Kallenberg, 1997/2002, p.
19, Lemma 1.37). Assumption 9(c) allows us to use Lebesgue dominated convergence
theorem. Compactness of Θ, and continuity of the criterion function over Θ2 would
ensure Assumption 9(c). Assumption 9(d), which seems mild, and allows us to normalize
the criterion function, so that it integrates to one.
Proposition 5. Denote the Prokhorov metric with ρP . Under Assumptions 1, and 4, if
θ∗T,C
P→ θ0 as T →∞, then
i) ρP (δθ∗T,C , δθ0)
P→ 0, as T → ∞, which, in turn, implies consistency of plain cali-
bration by Lemmas 2 and 5;
ii) under the additional Assumption 9, ρP
( ∫
. u(θ,θ
∗
T,C)λ(dθ)∫
Θ u(θ˙,θ
∗
T,C)λ(dθ˙)
,
∫
. u(θ,θ0)λ(dθ)∫
Θ u(θ˙,θ0)λ(dθ˙)
)
P→ 0, as
T →∞, which, in turn, implies consistency of weighted calibration by Lemmas 2
and 5.
Proof. i) By Portmanteau theorem, it is sufficient to check the point-wise convergence of
cumulative distribution functions (c.d.f.) at the continuity points of the limiting c.d.f.:
for all θ ∈ Θ that are continuity points of l[θ0,∞[(.), limT→∞ l[θ∗T,C ,∞[(θ)
P→ l[θ0,∞[(θ), as
T →∞ , by assumption.
ii) Under Assumption 9 (a)-(c), by the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, for
all B ∈ EΘ, as T →∞, ∫
B
u(θ, θ∗T,C)λ(dθ)
P→
∫
B
u(θ, θ0)λ(dθ).
Therefore, by Assumption 9 (d), for all B ∈ EΘ, as T →∞,∫
B
u(θ, θ∗T,C)λ(dθ)∫
Θ
u(θ˙, θ∗T,C)λ(dθ˙)
P→
∫
B
u(θ, θ0)λ(dθ)∫
Θ
u(θ˙, θ0)λ(dθ˙)
.
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where the LHS and RHS are probability measures on (Θ, EΘ) by Assumption 9 (a) and
standard properties of the Lebesgue integral. Then the result follows by the Portmanteau
theorem. 
F.2. Consistency of Gaussian and Laplace approximations. In this subsection,
we show that asymptotic normality of ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 implies consistency of ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 under
mild assumptions, i.e., asymptotic normality of ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 implies condition (a) of Lemma
2. Then, from this general result, we deduce consistency of the Gaussian and Laplace
approximations.
F.2.1. Consistency from asymptotic normality. It is is well-known that asymptotic nor-
mality implies consistency for random variables. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no result available for random probability measures. We require the following two mild
Assumptions 10 and 11 to prove this result for ̂P ◦ θ•T−1. Assumption 10 ensures that we
can study the convergence of ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 on the space of probability measures.
Assumption 10. The approximation of the distribution of the generic proxy is a random
probability measure from S∞ to Θ for T big enough P-a.s., i.e., for T big enough, (a)
[measurability condition] for all B ∈ EΘ, x1:∞ 7→ ̂P ◦ θ•T−1(B) is S∞/B-measurable; and
(b) [probability condition] ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 is a probability measure P-a.s.
Assumption 10 requires that we can approximate the distribution of θ•T P-a.s. in a
measurable way. The following Assumption 11 allows us to consider the Cholesky decom-
position of the proxy of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix, and its inverse.
Assumption 11. Σ˜T
P→ Σ˜, where Σ˜ is a positive-definite matrix, and (Σ˜T )T∈[[1,∞[[ a
sequence of σ(X1:∞)/B(Rp2)-measurable matrices that are symmetric w.p.a.1, as T →∞.
Remark 22. Σ˜ does not need to be Σ, which is the asymptotic variance of
√
T (θ•T − θ0):
see Assumption 6 on p. 23. 
The following Lemma is the main result of this subsection.
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Lemma 6. Denote the c.d.f. of ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 with Fˆθ•T , i.e., for all θ ∈ Θ, Fˆθ•T (θ) =
̂P ◦ θ•T−1(]−∞, θ]). Under Assumptions 1, 4, 10, and 11 if, as T →∞,
(a) θ˜T
P→ θ0, where θ˜T is σ(X1:∞)/EΘ-measurable,
(b) for all b ∈ Rp, Fˆθ•T
(
θ˜T + Σ˜
1
2
T
b√
T
)
P→ N(b; 0; Σ` 12 ),
then, as T →∞,
ρP
(
Fˆθ•T , δθ0
)
P→ 0, 6
which, in turn, implies consistency of ̂P ◦ θ•T−1 by Lemmas 2 and 5.
Proof. The idea of the proof is to map probability measures to random variables, and
then note that asymptotic normality trivially implies consistency for random variables.
By the upcoming Lemma 7, for T big enough, there exists a random variable ZT : (Ω ×
Θ, EΩ ⊗ EΘ)→ (Θ, EΘ) s.t. for all θ ∈ Rp,
P˘(ZT 6 θ|X1:∞) = Fˆθ•T (θ), (13)
where P˘ is a probability measure defined by equation (15) in Lemma 7. If a sequence of
symmetric matrices converges to a positive-definite matrix, the matrices of the sequence
are positive-definite for an index big enough.7 Thus, by Assumption 11, Σ˜T is a positive-
definite matrix w.p.a.1 as T → ∞, which implies that it has a Cholesky decomposition
w.p.a.1 as T →∞. Therefore, for T big enough, define
YT :=
√
T Σ˜
− 1
2
T (ZT − θ˜T ), (14)
6In this statement, we identify the c.d.f. with its corresponding probability measure. Hereafter, we follow
the same abuse of notation.
7By Corollary III.2.6 in Bhatia (1997), maxj∈[[1,p]] |eig↓j (Σ˜T )−eig↓j (Σ˜)| 6 ‖Σ˜T − Σ˜‖ where eig↓j (Σ˜) denotes
the eigenvalues of Σ˜ in descending order. Now, all the eigenvalues of Σ˜ are strictly positive, so that the
eigenvalues of Σ˜T are strictly positive w.p.a.1, as T →∞.
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so that, for all y ∈ Rp,
P˘(YT 6 y|X1:∞) = P˘(
√
T Σ˜
− 1
2
T (ZT − θ˜T ) 6 y|X1:∞)
= P˘
(
ZT 6 θ˜T + Σ˜
1
2
T
y√
T
|X1:∞
)
(a)
= Fˆθ•T (θ˜T + Σ˜
1
2
T
y√
T
)
(b)
P→ N(y; 0; Σ` 12 ) as T →∞
(a) By the σ(X1:∞)-measurability of θ˜T and Σ˜T (see condition (a), and Assumption 10),
disintegration of P˘ w.r.t. X1:∞ allows us to regard θ˜T and Σ˜T as fixed (e.g., Kallenberg,
1997/2002, Theorem 6.4), and thus to use equation (13). (b) Use condition (b).
Now, on one hand, convergence in probability is equivalent to convergence in L1 for
uniformly integrable sequences (e.g., Kallenberg, 1997/2002, Proposition 4.12). On the
other hand, P˘(YT 6 y|X1:∞) 6 1, which implies that it is uniformly integrable. Therefore,
as T →∞,
E˘
∣∣∣P˘(YT 6 y|X1:∞)−N(y; 0; Σ` 12 )∣∣∣ P˘→ 0
(a)⇒ |˘P(YT 6 y)−N(y; 0; Σ` 12 )| P˘→ 0
(b)⇒ YT d→ N (0, Σ`) , under P˘
(c)⇒ YT√
T
= OP˘
(
1√
T
)
(d)⇒ YT√
T
+ θ˜T
P˘−→ θ0
(e)⇒ ZT d→ θ0 , under P˘
(f)⇒ P˘(ZT 6 θ) P˘→ l[θ0,∞[(θ) at any continuity point θ of l[θ0,∞[(.)
(g)⇒ Fˆθ•T (θ) = P˘(ZT 6 θ|X1:∞)
P˘→ l[θ0,∞[(θ) at any continuity point θ of l[θ0,∞[(.)
(h)⇒ ρP
(
Fˆθ•T , δθ0
)
P→ 0
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(a) By iterated conditioning and positivity of probabilities, |˘P(YT 6 y) −N(y; 0; Σ` 12 )| =∣∣∣E˘|˘P(YT 6 y|X1:∞)| − E˘|N(y; 0; Σ` 12 )|∣∣∣ 6 E˘ ∣∣∣P˘(YT 6 y|X1:∞)−N(y; 0; Σ` 12 )∣∣∣, where the in-
equality follows from the reverse triangle inequality for the L1 norm. (b)-(c) Portmanteau
theorem. (d) By condition (a), θ˜T
P→ θ0, as T → ∞, which implies that θ˜T P˘→ θ0, as
T →∞ by the upcoming Lemma 7(iii). (e) Definition of YT by equation (14). (f) Apply
portmanteau theorem. (g) By consistency adequacy (see Remark 18 in Appendix A on
p. 43, and note that P˘ and θ˜T can take the place of P and θˆT , respectively, in the state-
ment of Proposition 2), P˘(ZT 6 θ|X1:∞) P˘→ l[θ0,∞[(θ), where P˘(ZT 6 θ|X1:∞) = Fˆθ•T (θ) by
equation (13).(h) Lemma 7(iii), Fˆθ•T (θ)
P→ l[θ0,∞[(θ) at continuity point of l[θ0,∞[(.). Then,
note that the converge w.r.t. the Prokhorov metric corresponds to the convergence in
law, which, in turn, is equivalent to the convergence of the c.d.f. at the continuity points
of the limiting c.d.f. 
Lemma 7. Let κ : S∞ × EΘ → [0, 1] be a random probability measure from S∞ to Θ.
Under Assumptions 1 and 4(a)(b), there exist
i) a probability measure P˘ on (Ω×Θ, EΩ ⊗ EΘ) s.t., for all A ∈ EΩ ⊗ EΘ,
P˘(A) = E
∫
Θ
lA(., θ)κ(X1:∞, dθ), (15)
ii) a random vector Z : (Ω×Θ, EΩ ⊗ EΘ)→ (Θ, EΘ) s.t., for all B ∈ EΘ,
P˘(Z ∈ B|X1:∞) = κ(X1:∞, B) P˘− a.s.,
iii) and, for all random sequences (WT )
∞
T=1, WT
P→ K, as T → ∞, where K is a
constant vector, is equivalent to WT
P˘−→ K, as T →∞.
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Proof. i)-ii) It corresponds to Lemma 6.9 in Kallenberg (1997/2002). iii) For all neigh-
borhoods NK of K,
P˘(WT ∈ NK) = P˘{(ω, θ) ∈ Ω×Θ : WT (ω) ∈ NK}
(a)
= E
∫
Θ
l{ω∈Ω:WT (ω)∈NK}×Θ(., θ)κ(X1:∞, dθ)
(b)
= El{ω∈Ω:WT (ω)∈NK}(.)
∫
Θ
κ(X1:∞, dθ)
(c)
= El{ω∈Ω:WT (ω)∈NK}(.) = P(WT ∈ NK)
(a) Definition of P˘ given by equation (15). (b) For all ω˙ ∈ Ω and θ ∈ Θ, l{ω∈Ω:WT (ω)∈NK}×Θ(ω˙, θ) =
l{ω∈Ω:WT (ω)∈NK}(ω˙). (c) By, definition of the Lebesgue integral for step functions,
∫
Θ
κ(X1:∞, dθ) =
κ(X1:∞,Θ), and then κ(X1:∞,Θ) = 1 because, for all x1:∞ ∈ S∞, κ(x1:∞, .) is a probability
measure on (Θ, EΘ).
Therefore, WT
P→ K, as T →∞, is equivalent to WT P˘−→ K, as T →∞. 
F.2.2. Consistency of Gaussian approximations.
Proposition 6. Let Σ˜ be a positive-definite matrix, and (ΣˆT )
∞
T=1 a sequence of σ(X1:∞)/B(Rp2)-
measurable matrices. Under Assumptions 1, 4, and 6, if, as T → ∞, ΣˆT P→ Σ where Σ
is a positive-definite matrix, then, as T →∞,
ρP
(
N
(
.; θ∗T,G;
diag(ΣˆT )
1
2√
T
)
, δθ0
)
P→ 0,
which, in turn, implies consistency of the Gaussian approximation by Lemmas 2 and 5.
Proof. Check assumptions of Lemma 6 with Fˆθ•T (.) = N
(
.; θ∗T,G; diag(ΣˆT )
1
2/
√
T
)
, Σ˜T =
diag(ΣˆT ), and for Σ˜ = diag(Σ˜), and then apply it. Assumption 10 is verified because
Fˆθ•T (.) = N
(
.; θ∗T,G; diag(ΣˆT )
1
2/
√
T
)
= N
(√
Tdiag(ΣˆT )
− 1
2 (.− θ∗T,G); 0, I
)
where θ∗T and
ΣˆT are measurable by definition, and N (.; 0, I) is continuous. Assumption 11 is verified
because a diagonal matrix is symmetric, and Σ is positive-definite by assumption. As-
sumption (a) of Lemma 6 is verified by Assumption 6. Assumption (b) of Lemma 6 is
verified because, by the change of variable u =
√
Tdiag(ΣˆT )
− 1
2 (θ − θ∗T,G), for all b ∈ Rp,
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N
(
θ∗T,G + diag(ΣˆT )
1
2
b√
T
; θ∗T,G; diag(ΣˆT )
1
2/
√
T
)
= 1√
2piT p|diag(ΣˆT )|det
∫ θ∗T,G+diag(ΣˆT ) 12 b√T
−∞ exp
[
−T
2
(θ − θ∗T,G)′diag(ΣˆT )−1(θ − θ∗T,G)
]
λ(dθ)
= 1√
2pi
∫ b
−∞ exp
[−1
2
u′u
]
λ(du) = N(b; 0; 1). 
F.2.3. Consistency of Laplace approximations. In this subsection, under mild technical
assumptions, we deduce the consistency of weighted and criterion-adjusted Laplace ap-
proximations from the Bernstein-von Mises theorem, i.e., Assumption 12(c).
Assumption 12. (a)For T big enough, w(.) > 0 P-a.s. (b) For T big enough, 0 <∫
Θ
eTQT (X1:T ,θ˙)w(θ˙)λ(dθ˙) < ∞ P-a.s. (c) [Bernstein-von Mises theorem] For all b ∈ Rp,
as T →∞,
Fˆθ•T
(
θ∗T,L +
b√
T
)
P→ N(b; 0; Σ 12 )
where Fˆθ•T (θ) :=
∫ θ
−∞
eTQT (X1:T ,θ¨)w(θ¨)∫
Θ e
TQT (X1:T ,θ˙)w(θ˙)λ(dθ˙)
λ(θ¨), and θ∗T,L ∈ arg maxθ¨∈Θ eTQT (X1:T ,θ¨). (d)
For all x1:∞ ∈ S∞, eTQT (x1:T ,.)w(.) is EΘ/B(R+)-measurable.
Assumption 12(c) has been established under general assumptions (e.g., Le Cam, 1953,
1958; Chen, 1985; Kim, 1998; Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003). Assumption 12 (a)(b)
ensures that Fˆθ•T (.) is a c.d.f. P-a.s. for T big enough. For the consistency of the criterion-
adjusted weighted Laplace approximation, we also require the following Assumption 13.
Assumption 12(d) is a weak requirement that ensures the existence of random variables
with a distribution specified through Fˆθ•T (.).
Assumption 13. (a) For all θ ∈ Θ, θ˙ 7→ u(θ, θ˙) is continuous and bounded.
(b) There exists a function h : Θ→ R s.t., for all θ ∈ Θ, for T big enough, ∫
Θ
u(θ, θ¨)eTQT (X1:T ,θ¨)w(θ¨)λ(dθ¨) <
h(θ) P-a.s., and
∫
T
h(θ)λ(dθ) <∞.
Assumption 13(a) typically follows from the continuity of u(., .), and the compactness
of Θ, while Assumption 13(b) typically follows from the assumptions on QT (X1:T , θ¨), that
are needed to establish Assumption 12(c).
Proposition 7. Under Assumptions 1, 4, 11, and 12, if, as T →∞, θ∗T,L P→ θ0, then
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i) ρP
(
Fˆθ•T,WL(.), δθ0
)
P→ 0, as T → ∞, which, in turn, implies consistency of the
weighted Laplace approximation by Lemmas 2 and 5;
ii) under the additional Assumptions 9(a) and 13, as T →∞,
ρP
(∫
.
∫
Θ u(θ,θ¨)e
TQT (X1:T ,θ¨)w(θ¨)λ(dθ¨)λ(dθ)∫
Θ2 u(θ,θ˙)e
TQT (X1:T ,θ˙)w(θ˙)λ(dθ˙)λ(dθ)
,
∫
. u(θ,θ0)λ(dθ)∫
Θ u(θ˙,θ0)λ(dθ˙)
)
P→ 0, which, in turn, implies
consistency of the criterion-adjusted weighted Laplace approximation by Lemmas
2 and 5.
Proof. i) Check assumptions of Lemma 6 with Σ˜T = I, and for Σ˜ = I, and then apply
it. Assumption 10 is verified because, under Assumptions 12(a)(b)(d), by the upcoming
Lemma 8, for T big enough, ̂P ◦ θ•T,WL−1 :=
∫
.
eTQT (X1:T ,θ¨)w(θ¨)∫
Θ e
TQT (X1:T ,θ˙)w(θ˙)λ(dθ˙)
λ(θ¨) defines a random
probability measure from S∞ to (Θ, EΘ) . Assumptions (a) and (b) of Lemma 6 are
verified by assumption of Proposition 7 and Assumption 12(c), respectively.
ii) By i), as T → ∞, ρP
(
Fˆθ•T (.), δθ0
)
P→ 0. Thus, by definition of the convergence in
law and Assumption 13(a), for all θ ∈ Θ, as T →∞,
⇒
∫
Θ
u(θ, θ¨)
eTQT (X1:T ,θ¨)w(θ¨)∫
Θ
eTQT (X1:T ,θ˙)w(θ˙)λ(dθ˙)
λ(dθ¨)
P→ u(θ, θ0)
(a)⇒ ∀B ∈ EΘ,
∫
B
∫
Θ
u(θ, θ¨)
eTQT (X1:T ,θ¨)w(θ¨)∫
Θ
eTQT (X1:T ,θ˙)w(θ˙)λ(dθ˙)
λ(dθ¨)λ(dθ)
P→
∫
B
u(θ, θ0)λ(dθ)
(b)⇒ ∀B ∈ EΘ,
∫
B
∫
Θ
u(θ, θ¨)eTQT (X1:T ,θ¨)w(θ¨)λ(dθ¨)λ(dθ)∫
Θ2
u(θ, θ˙)eTQT (X1:T ,θ˙)w(θ˙)λ(dθ˙)λ(dθ)
P→
∫
B
u(θ, θ0)λ(dθ)∫
Θ
u(θ˙, θ0)λ(dθ˙)
(c)⇒ ρP
(∫
.
∫
Θ
u(θ, θ¨)eTQT (X1:T ,θ¨)w(θ¨)λ(dθ¨)λ(dθ)∫
Θ2
u(θ, θ˙)eTQT (X1:T ,θ˙)w(θ˙)λ(dθ˙)λ(dθ)
,
∫
.
u(θ, θ0)λ(dθ)∫
Θ
u(θ˙, θ0)λ(dθ˙)
)
P→ 0
(a) By Assumption 13(b), apply Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem. (b) Note
that simplification of the denominators yields
∫
B
∫
Θ u(θ,θ¨)e
TQT (X1:T ,θ¨)w(θ¨)λ(dθ¨)λ(dθ)∫
Θ2 u(θ,θ˙)e
TQT (X1:T ,θ˙)w(θ˙)λ(dθ˙)λ(dθ)
=
∫
B
∫
Θ u(θ,θ¨)
eTQT (X1:T ,θ¨)w(θ¨)∫
Θ e
TQT (X1:T ,θ˙)w(θ˙)λ(dθ˙)
λ(dθ¨)λ(dθ)
∫
Θ2 u(θ,θ¨)
eTQT (X1:T ,θ¨)w(θ¨)∫
Θ e
TQT (X1:T ,θ˙)w(θ˙)λ(dθ˙)
λ(dθ¨)λ(dθ)
, and then apply twice the previous line, with B =
B and B = Θ. (c) Apply Portmanteau theorem. 
Lemma 8. If, for all x1:∞ ∈ S∞, a function g : S∞×Θ→ R is EΘ/B(R)-measurable on
Θ, then, for all A ∈ EΘ, x1:∞ 7→
∫
A
g(x1:∞, θ)λ(dθ) is S∞/B(R)-measurable.
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Proof. Let A ∈ EΘ. Define for this proof
HA :=
h(., .) :
h : S∞ ×Θ→ R
∀θ ∈ Θ, h(., θ) is S∞/B(R)-measurable
x1:∞ 7→
∫
A
h(x1:∞, θ)λ(dθ) is S∞/B(R)-measurable

Check the assumptions of a functional form of Sierspinki monotone class theorem(e.g.,
Florens, Mouchart and Rolin, 1990, Theorem 0.2.21). First, HA is a R-vector space be-
cause measurability is preserved by linear combinations, and because the integral of a
linear combination of functions is the linear combination of the integrals of the respective
functions. Second, HA contains the constant function 1. Third, if (hn(.))n>1 is a sequence
of non-negative functions in HA such that hn(.) ↑ h(.) where h(.) is a bounded function
on Θ, then h(.) ∈ HA by preservation of measurability under limit and the Lebesgue
monotone convergence theorem. Fourth, HA contains the indicator function of every set
in the pi-system consisting of measurable rectangles, I :=
{
R ∩Θ : R := R˜ ∩Θ with
R˜ =
∏p
i=1[ai, bi] where (ai, bi) ∈ R2 ∧ ai 6 bi
}
(an intersection of two measurable rectan-
gles is a measurable rectangle) because, for all R ∈ I, (i) ∀θ ∈ Θ, x1:∞ 7→ lR(θ) is
S∞/B(R)-measurable, (ii) and for all A ∈ EΘ, x1:∞ 7→
∫
A
lR(θ)λ(dθ) = λ(A ∩ R) <
λ(Θ) <∞ is S∞/B(R)-measurable.
As σ(I) = EΘ, by a functional form of Sierspinki monotone class, if a function g(., .)
is EΘ/B(R)-measurable, g ∈ HA, and thus x1:∞ 7→
∫
A
g(x1:∞, θ)λ(dθ) is S∞/B(R)-
measurable. 
Appendix G. Notations and overview of some practices
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